Search results for: personhood

Authors: Meshandren Naidoo

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Personhood is an important philosophical and ethical device that belies many major ethical and legal issues. The concept of African personhood is often overlooked, however, given the decolonization projects occurring in Africa, it is important to consider this view. African personhood, as opposed to Western personhood, is not individualistic in nature. The latter is predominantly Kantian and based on the notion that all persons have equal moral due to their capacity for a reason, whereas communitarianism is central to an African conception of personhood.

Keywords: African philosophy, bioethics, ethics, personhood

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Authors: Meshandren Naidoo, Amy Gooden

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The concept of personhood extending from the moral status of an artificial intelligence system has been explored – but predominantly from a Western conception of personhood. African personhood, however, is distinctly different from Western personhood in that communitarianism is central rather than individualism. Given the decolonization projects happening in Africa, it’s paramount to consider these views. This research demonstrates that the African notion of personhood may extend for an artificial intelligent system where the pre-conditions are met.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, ethics, law, personhood, policy

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Authors: M. Naidoo

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The concept of moral personhood extending from the moral status of an artificial intelligence system has been explored – but predominantly from a Western conception of personhood. African personhood, however, is distinctly different from Western personhood in that communitarianism is central to the underpinnings of personhood - rather than Western individualism. Personhood in the African context is not an inherent property that a human is born with; rather, it is an ontological journey that one goes on in his or her life with the hopes of attaining personhood. Given the decolonization, projects happening in Africa, and the law-making that is happening in this space within South Africa, it is of paramount importance to consider these views.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, bioethics, law, legal personality

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Authors: Meshandren Naidoo, Amy Gooden

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Implantable brain-computer interface (BCI) technologies have developed to the point where brain-computer communication is possible. This has great potential in the medical field, as it allows persons who have lost capacities. However, ethicists and regulators call for a strict approach to these technologies due to the impact on personhood. This research demonstrates that the personhood debate is more nuanced and that where an African approach to personhood is used, it may produce results more favorable to the development and use of this technology.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, law, neuroscience, ethics

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Authors: Solomon Okorley

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With the emergence of artificial intelligence, a proposition that has been made with increasing conviction is the need to assign legal personhood to robots. A major problem that arises when dealing with robots is the issue of liability: who do it hold liable when a robot causes harm? The suggestion to assign legal personality to robots has been made to aid in the assignment of liability. This paper contends that it is premature to assign legal personhood to robots. The paper employed the doctrinal and comparative research methodology. The paper first discusses the various theories that underpin the granting of legal personhood to juridical personalities to ascertain whether these theories can aid in the proposition to assign legal personhood to robots. These theories include fiction theory, aggregate theory, realist theory, and organism theory. Except for the aggregate theory, the fiction theory, the realist theory and the organism theory provide a good foundation to the proposal for legal personhood to be assigned to robots. The paper considers whether robots should be assigned legal personhood from a jurisprudential approach. The legal positivists assert that no metaphysical presuppositions are needed to determine who could be a legal person: the sole deciding factor is the engagement in legal relations and this prerequisite could be fulfilled by robots. However, rationalists, religionists and naturalists assert that the satisfaction of the metaphysical criteria is the basis of legal personality and since robots do not possess this feature, they cannot be assigned legal personhood. This differing perspective shows that the jurisprudential school of thought to which one belongs influences the decision whether to assign legal personhood to robots. The paper makes arguments for and against the assigning of legal personhood to robots. Assigning legal personhood to robots is necessary for the assigning of liability; and since robots are independent in their operation, they should be assigned legal personhood. However, it is argued that the degree of autonomy is insufficient. Robots do not understand legal obligations; they do not have a will of their own and the purported autonomy that they possess is an ‘imputed autonomy’. A crucial question to be asked is ‘whether it is desirable to confer legal personhood on robots’ and not ‘whether legal personhood should be assigned to robots’. This is due to the subjective nature of the responses to such a question as well as the peculiarities of countries in response to this question. The main argument in support of assigning legal personhood to robots is to aid in assigning liability. However, it is argued conferring legal personhood on robots is not the only way to deal with liability issues. Since any of the stakeholders involved with the robot system can be held liable for an accident, it is not desirable to assign legal personhood to robot. It is forecasted that in the epoch of strong artificial intelligence, granting robots legal personhood is plausible; however, in the current era, it is premature.

Keywords: autonomy, legal personhood, premature, jurisprudential

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Authors: Nikolaos Souvlakis

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The present paper negotiates the effect of 'the evil eye' on individuals' mental health while at the same time poses the problem of how the evil eye fits into the anthropological arena as a key question that forges a fundamental link between religion, anthropology and mental health professions. It is the argument of the paper that the evil eye is an essential and fundamental human phenomenon and therefore any scholarly field involved in its study must consider the insight it provides into the development of personhood. The study was an anthropological study in the geographical area of Corfu, a Greek Orthodox society uninfluenced by the Ottoman Islamic Culture. The paper aims to deepen our understanding of the evil eye as it analyses the interaction between the evil eye and gaze and how they affect the development of personhood; based on the empirical data collected from the fieldwork. Therefore, the paper adopts a psychoanalytic anthropology approach to facilitate a better understanding of the evil eye through the accounts of individuals’ journeys in the process of their development of personhood. Finally, the paper aims to offer a detailed analysis of the particular element of eye (‘I’) and, more specifically, of ‘the others’, as they relate to the phenomenon of the evil eye.

Keywords: gaze, evil eye, mental health, personhood

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Authors: Sanelisiwe Ndlovu

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Cities have become testbeds for automation and experimenting with artificial intelligence (AI) in managing urban services and public spaces. Smart Cities and AI systems are changing most human experiences from health and education to personal relations. For instance, in healthcare, social robots are being implemented as tools to assist patients. Similarly, in education, social robots are being used as tutors or co-learners to promote cognitive and affective outcomes. With that general picture in mind, one can now ask a further question about Smart Cities and artificial agents and their moral standing in the African context of personhood. There has been a wealth of literature on the topic of personhood; however, there is an absence of literature on African personhood in highly automated environments. Personhood in African philosophy is defined by the role one can and should play in the community. However, in today’s technologically advanced world, a risk is that machines become more capable of accomplishing tasks that humans would otherwise do. Further, on many African communitarian accounts, personhood and moral standing are associated with active relationality with the community. However, in the Smart City, human closeness is gradually diminishing. For instance, humans already do engage and identify with robotic entities, sometimes even romantically. The primary aim of this study is to investigate how African conceptions of personhood and community interact in a highly automated environment such as Smart Cities. Accordingly, this study lies in presenting a rarely discussed African perspective that emphasizes the necessity and the importance of relationality in handling Smart Cities and AI ethically. Thus, the proposed approach can be seen as the sub-Saharan African contribution to personhood and the growing AI debates, which takes the reality of the interconnectedness of society seriously. And it will also open up new opportunities to tackle old problems and use existing resources to confront new problems in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Keywords: smart city, artificial intelligence, personhood, community

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Authors: Rebecca Haythorne

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Background: Agendas continuously emphasise the need to increase work based training and opportunities for individuals with learning disabilities. However research and statistics suggest that there is still significant stigma and stereotypes as to what they can contribute, or gain from being part of the working environment. Method: To tackles some of these prejudices an Occupational Therapy based intervention was developed for learning disability service users working at a social enterprise farm. The intervention aimed to increase positive public perception around individual capabilities and encourage individuals with learning disabilities to take ownership and be proud of their individual personhood and citizenship. This was achieved by using components of the Model of Human Occupation to tailor the intervention to individual values, skills and working contributions. The final project involved making creative wall art for public viewing, focusing on 'who works there and what they do'. This was accompanied by a visitor information guide, allowing individuals to tell visitors about themselves, the work they do and why it is meaningful to them. Outcomes: The intervention has helped to increased metal well-being and confidence of learning disability service users “people will know I work here now” and “I now have something to show my family about the work I do at the farm”. The intervention has also increased positive public perception and community awareness “you can really see the effort that’s gone into doing this” and “it’s a really visual experience to see people you don’t expect to see doing this type of work”. Resources left behind have further supported individuals to take ownership in creating more wall art to be sold at the farm shop. Conclusion: the intervention developed has helped to improve mental well-being of both service users and staff and improve community awareness. Due to this, the farm has decided to roll out the intervention to other areas of the social enterprise and is considering having more Occupational Therapy involvement in the future.

Keywords: citizenship, intervention, occupational therapy, personhood

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Authors: Evangelos Koumparoudis

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The definition of death is a deep philosophical question, and no single meaning can be ascribed to it. This essay focuses on the ontological, epistemological, and ethical aspects of death and dying in view of technological progress in information technology and biomedicine. It starts with the ad hoc 1968 Harvard committee that proposed that the criterion for the definition of death be irreversible coma and then refers to the debate over the whole brain death formula, emphasizing the integrated function of the organism and higher brain formula, taking consciousness and personality as essential human characteristics. It follows with the contribution of information technology in personalized and precision medicine and anti-aging measures aimed at life prolongation. It also touches on the possibility of the creation of human-machine hybrids and how this raises ontological and ethical issues that concern the “cyborgization” of human beings and the conception of the organism and personhood based on a post/transhumanist essence, and, furthermore, if sentient AI capable of autonomous decision-making that might even surpass human intelligence (singularity, superintelligence) deserves moral or legal personhood. Finally, there is the question as to whether death and dying should be redefined at a transcendent level, which is reinforced by already-existing technologies of “virtual after-” life and the possibility of uploading human minds. In the last section, I refer to the current (and future) applications of nanomedicine in diagnostics, therapeutics, implants, and tissue engineering as well as the aspiration to “immortality” by cryonics. The definition of death is reformulated since age and disease elimination may be realized, and the criterion of irreversibility may be challenged.

Keywords: death, posthumanism, infomedicine, nanomedicine, cryonics

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Authors: Sofia Quaglia, Carmine Di Martino, Brendan Tierney

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Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) constitutes various aspects of modern life, from the Machine Learning algorithms predicting the stocks on Wall streets to the killing of belligerents and innocents alike on the battlefield. Moreover, the end goal is to create autonomous A.I.; this means that the presence of humans in the decision-making process will be absent. The question comes naturally: when an A.I. does something wrong when its behavior is harmful to the community and its actions go against the law, which is to be held responsible? This research’s subject matter in A.I. and Robot Ethics focuses mainly on Robot Rights and its ultimate objective is to answer the questions: (i) What is the function of rights? (ii) Who is a right holder, what is personhood and the requirements needed to be a moral agent (therefore, accountable for responsibility)? (iii) Can an A.I. be a moral agent? (ontological requirements) and finally (iv) if it ought to be one (ethical implications). With the direction to answer this question, this research project was done via a collaboration between the School of Computer Science in the Technical University of Dublin that oversaw the technical aspects of this work, as well as the Department of Philosophy in the University of Milan, who supervised the philosophical framework and argumentation of the project. Firstly, it was found that all rights are positive and based on consensus; they change with time based on circumstances. Their function is to protect the social fabric and avoid dangerous situations. The same goes for the requirements considered necessary to be a moral agent: those are not absolute; in fact, they are constantly redesigned. Hence, the next logical step was to identify what requirements are regarded as fundamental in real-world judicial systems, comparing them to that of ones used in philosophy. Autonomy, free will, intentionality, consciousness and responsibility were identified as the requirements to be considered a moral agent. The work went on to build a symmetrical system between personhood and A.I. to enable the emergence of the ontological differences between the two. Each requirement is introduced, explained in the most relevant theories of contemporary philosophy, and observed in its manifestation in A.I. Finally, after completing the philosophical and technical analysis, conclusions were drawn. As underlined in the research questions, there are two issues regarding the assignment of moral agency to artificial agent: the first being that all the ontological requirements must be present and secondly being present or not, whether an A.I. ought to be considered as an artificial moral agent. From an ontological point of view, it is very hard to prove that an A.I. could be autonomous, free, intentional, conscious, and responsible. The philosophical accounts are often very theoretical and inconclusive, making it difficult to fully detect these requirements on an experimental level of demonstration. However, from an ethical point of view it makes sense to consider some A.I. as artificial moral agents, hence responsible for their own actions. When considering artificial agents as responsible, there can be applied already existing norms in our judicial system such as removing them from society, and re-educating them, in order to re-introduced them to society. This is in line with how the highest profile correctional facilities ought to work. Noticeably, this is a provisional conclusion and research must continue further. Nevertheless, the strength of the presented argument lies in its immediate applicability to real world scenarios. To refer to the aforementioned incidents, involving the murderer of innocents, when this thesis is applied it is possible to hold an A.I. accountable and responsible for its actions. This infers removing it from society by virtue of its un-usability, re-programming it and, only when properly functioning, re-introducing it successfully

Keywords: artificial agency, correctional system, ethics, natural agency, responsibility

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Authors: Finley Lawson

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The triune nature of God is one of the most complex doctrines of Christianity, and its complexity is further compounded when one considers the incarnation. However, many of the difficulties and paradoxes associated with our idea of the divine arise from our adherence to reductionist ontology. In order to move our theological discourse forward, in respect to divine and human nature, a holistic interpretation of our profession of faith is necessary. The challenge of a holistic interpretation is that it questions our ability to make any statement about the genuine, ontological individuation of persons (both divine and human), and in doing so raises the issue of whether we are, ontologically, bound to descend in to a form of pan(en)theism. In order to address the ‘inevitable’ slide in to pan(en)theism. The impact of two forms of holistic interpretation, Boolean and Non-Boolean, on our concept of personhood will be examined. Whilst a Boolean interpretation allows for a greater understanding of the relational nature of the Trinity, it is the Non-Boolean interpretation which has greater ontological significance. A Non-Boolean ontology, grounded in our scientific understanding of the nature of the world, shows our quest for individuation rests not in ontological fact but in epistemic need, and that it is our limited epistemology that drives our need to divide that which is ontologically indivisible. This discussion takes place within a ‘methodological’, rather than ‘doctrinal’ approach to science and religion - examining assumptions and methods that have shaped our language and beliefs about key doctrines, rather than seeking to reconcile particular Christian doctrines with particular scientific theories. Concluding that Non-Boolean holism is the more significant for our doctrine is, in itself, not enough. A world without division appears much removed from the distinct place of man and divine as espoused in our creedal affirmation, to this end, several possible interpretations for understanding Non-Boolean human – divine relations are tentatively put forward for consideration.

Keywords: holism, individuation, ontology, Trinitarian relations

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Authors: Rachel K. Cremona

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Forty years ago, Vila Autodromo was a small fishing settlement in southwest Rio de Janeiro. By 2012, Vila Autodromo had established itself into a working class neighborhood – certainly not a slum, but nonetheless designated as a ‘favela’ as a consequence of its history as an illegal settlement that was thus never provided with public services. Vila Autodromo sits on a large lagoon, adjacent to the Olympic Park being constructed for the 2016 Olympic Games to be held in Rio, and looks out over the expensive high rise condominiums that have sprouted across the water. In 2009, when Rio submitted their bid for the Olympic games, there were approximately 900 families that called Vila Autodromo home, and the original plans for the games clearly show their homes remaining in place. Today, only a handful of these homes remain. This paper will utilize the case study of Vila Autodromo to examine the broader issue of Favelas in 21st century Rio de Janeiro. While race and poverty have become synonymous with Brazil’s inegalitarian social order – and personified by the thousands of favelas scattered in and around large cities like Rio and Sao Paulo – much less attention has been given to the political status of the nation’s invisible majority. In particular, this research will examine the question of citizenship and argue that the most fundamental problem of inequality in Brazil is not simply a product of history, race and social order, but more specifically a problem of ‘personhood’. The political marginalization of Brazil’s poor does not simply reinforce their social marginalization, it institutionalizes it in a way that makes it almost impossible to escape. The story of Vila Autodromo captures this problem in a way that not only illustrates the clear (though ambiguous) role of the state in the perpetuation of Brazil’s underclass, but also the human resilience that it has fostered.

Keywords: citizenship, poverty, displacement, favela

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Authors: Sachin Sharma

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Sexual consent is integral to every sexual relationship. It is a process to facilitate sexual autonomy and bodily integrity. It assures complete sexual personhood and allows an individual to explore her sexual expressions independently. But the said proposition is not true for people with psychosocial disabilities. Generally, they are considered seraphic or mephistophelic and denied access to sexual autonomy. This result in institutionalizing the sexuality of disabled persons, where the eugenics-ableist narrative defines assessment and access to consent. This way, sexuality and disability are distanced apart. It is primarily due to the stigmatized socio-cultural constructs of sexuality that define sex within a “standard” and “charmed” circle. Such stigmatized expression influences the law, as it considers people with psychosocial disabilities incapable of sexual consent. The approach of legal institutions is very narrow towards interpreting their sexual rights. It echoes the modernist-ableism and strangulates the sexual choices. This way, it reflects the repressive model of sex and denies space to people with psychosocial disabilities. Moreover, judicial courts follow old and conservative methods while dealing with sexual issues. For instance, courts still practice the “standardized” norm of intelligence quotient (IQ) for determining the credibility of persons with psychosocial disabilities. Further, there is still doubt about assistive communicative techniques. This paper will try to question the normative structure of sexual consent and related laws while specifically addressing the issues of sex as desire and abuse. Considering the commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (herein referred to as UNCRPD) and common law experience, the paper will draw a comparative study on the legal position of sexual rights in India. The paper will also analyze the role of UNCRPD in addressing sexual rights. The author will examine the position of sexual rights of people with psychosocial disabilities after the drafting of UNCRPD and specific state laws. The paper primarily follows the doctrinal method.

Keywords: sexual autonomy, institutionalized choices, overregulated laws, violation of individuality

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Authors: Aileen Editha

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The legal recognition of property rights over human genes is a divisive topic to which there is no resolution. As a frequently discussed topic, scholars and practitioners often highlight the inadequacies of a proprietary regime. However, little has been said in regard to the nature of human genetic materials (HGMs). This paper proposes approaching the issue of property over HGMs from an alternative perspective that looks at the personal and social value and valuation of HGMs. This paper will highlight how the unique and unresolved status of HGMs is incompatible with the main tenets of property and, consequently, contributes to legal ambiguity and uncertainty in the regulation of property rights over human genes. HGMs are perceived as part of nature and a free-for-all while also being within an individual’s private sphere. Additionally, it is also considered to occupy a unique “not-private-nor-public” status. This limbo-like position clashes with property’s fundamental characteristic that relies heavily on a clear public/private dichotomy. Moreover, as property is intrinsically linked to the legal recognition of one’s personhood, this irresolution benefits some while disadvantages others. In particular, it demands the publicization of once-private genes for the “common good” but subsequently encourages privatization (through labor) of these now-public genes. This results in the gain of some (already privileged) individuals while enabling the disenfranchisement of members of minority groups, such as Indigenous communities. This paper will discuss real and intellectual property rights over human genes, such as the right to income or patent rights, in Canada and the US. This paper advocates for a sui generis approach to governing rights and interests over human genes that would not rely on having a strict public/private dichotomy. Not only would this improve legal certainty and clarity, but it would also alleviate—or, at the very least, minimize—the role that the current law plays in further entrenching existing systemic inequalities. Despite the specificity of this topic, this paper argues that there are broader lessons to be learned. This issue is an insightful case study on the interconnection of various principles in law, society, and property, and what must be done when discordance between one or more of those principles has detrimental societal outcomes. Ultimately, it must be remembered that property is an adaptable and malleable instrument that can be developed to ensure it contributes to equity and flourishing.

Keywords: property rights, human genetic materials, critical legal scholarship, systemic inequalities

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Authors: Taarika Singh

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Military wives – women married to army officers have largely been recognized as mere supporters or as auxiliaries to military men rather than propagators of thought and ideologies. The military wife (and her participation) is often dismissed as 'private', 'domestic', or 'trivial' and is acknowledged, if at all, only as an (inevitable/normative) entity, seen as a natural product/outcome of militarization. It is because the military wife has come to be constructed and accepted as normative by states and militaries that women of the military are easily ‘trivialised’ and are made to appear to be socially, politically, or theoretically irrelevantand/or insignificant. This paper, using ethnography-- structured and semi-structured interviews -- makes a gendered analysis of militarization, by bringing the military wife to the forefront and placing her at the nexus of the military and state apparatus. Moving away from gendered analyses that focus on the impact of militarization on women or draw attention to the ways in which militarization has been challenged/resisted by women, the paper pays attention to the centrality of women in shaping, validating, and perpetuating militarization, patriarchal control, and gendered hierarchies. The paper will demonstrate how military wives accept and comply with patriarchy as an institutional form of social organization that extends beyond the family and kinship relations into the military as an organization of the state. The paper will draw attention to the ways in which military norms, patriarchal values, and belief systems shape the social personhood, identity, and worldview of military wives; as a consequence of which, women play a central role in upholding and reproducing social inequalities and hierarchies; in shaping social status, and power relationships amongst men and women within and outside the military. The paper will allude to the processes and ideologies via which womena) accept and reproducemen as exclusive holders of power, status, and privilege; and b) recognize international relations, politics, andmatters related to security to be male dominated arenas inviting overwhelming masculine participation. In doing so, the paper will argue that women of the military play a critical role in perpetuating and upholding gendered meanings associated with the notion of and discourse around security. The paper will illustratehow military wives accept and assume security to be inherently a gendered idea -- a masculine notion, a male dominated arena, as something granted by men. In other words, the paper will demonstrate how the militarization of the military wives and the perpetuation of militarization by military wives plays a crucial role in propagating and perpetuating security to be a masculine notion or a male dominated arena. The paper will then question the degree to which such gendered analyses can shape the broader meanings, definitions, and discourses around security, matters related to security, and security threats.

Keywords: gender, militarisation, security, women

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Authors: Mathilde Pavis

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From Schumann to Van Gogh, Frida Kahlo, and Ray Charles, the stories narrating the careers of artists with physical or mental disabilities are becoming increasingly popular. From the emergence of ‘pathography’ at the end of 18th century to cinematographic portrayals, the work and lives of differently-abled creative individuals continue to fascinate readers, spectators and researchers. The achievements of those artists form the tip of the iceberg composed of complex politico-cultural movements which continue to advocate for wider recognition of disabled artists’ contribution to western culture. This paper envisages copyright law as a potential tool to such end. It investigates the array of rights available to artists with intellectual disabilities to assert their position as authors of their artwork in the twenty-first-century looking at international and national copyright laws (UK and US). Put simply, this paper questions whether an artist’s intellectual disability could be a barrier to assert their intellectual property rights over their creation. From a legal perspective, basic principles of non-discrimination would contradict the representation of artists’ disability as an obstacle to authorship as granted by intellectual property laws. Yet empirical studies reveal that artists with intellectual disabilities are often denied the opportunity to exercise their intellectual property rights or any form of agency over their work. In practice, it appears that, unlike other non-disabled artists, the prospect for differently-abled creators to make use of their right is contingent to the context in which the creative process takes place. Often will the management of such rights rest with the institution, art therapist or mediator involved in the artists’ work as the latter will have necessitated greater support than their non-disabled peers for a variety of reasons, either medical or practical. Moreover, the financial setbacks suffered by medical institutions and private therapy practices have renewed administrators’ and physicians’ interest in monetising the artworks produced under their supervision. Adding to those economic incentives, the rise of criminal and civil litigation in psychiatric cases has also encouraged the retention of patients’ work by therapists who feel compelled to keep comprehensive medical records to shield themselves from liability in the event of a lawsuit. Unspoken transactions, contracts, implied agreements and consent forms have thus progressively made their way into the relationship between those artists and their therapists or assistants, disregarding any notions of copyright. The question of artists’ authorship finds itself caught in an unusually multi-faceted web of issues formed by tightening purse strings, ethical concerns and the fear of civil or criminal liability. Whilst those issues are playing out behind closed doors, the popularity of what was once called the ‘Art of the Insane’ continues to grow and open new commercial avenues. This socio-economic context exacerbates the need to devise a legal framework able to help practitioners, artists and their advocates navigate through those issues in such a way that neither this minority nor our cultural heritage suffers from the fragmentation of the legal protection available to them.

Keywords: authorship, copyright law, intellectual disabilities, art therapy and mediation

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Authors: Adam J. Bowen

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Abstract— Should robots have rights or legal protections. Often debates concerning whether robots and AI should be afforded rights focus on conditions of personhood and the possibility of future advanced forms of AI satisfying particular intrinsic cognitive and moral attributes of rights-holding persons. Such discussions raise compelling questions about machine consciousness, autonomy, and value alignment with human interests. Although these are important theoretical concerns, especially from a future design perspective, they provide limited guidance for addressing the moral and legal standing of current and near-term AI that operate well below the cognitive and moral agency of human persons. Robots and AI are already being pressed into service in a wide range of roles, especially in healthcare and biomedical contexts. The design and large-scale implementation of robots in the context of core societal institutions like healthcare systems continues to rapidly develop. For example, we bring them into our homes, hospitals, and other care facilities to assist in care for the sick, disabled, elderly, children, or otherwise vulnerable persons. We enlist surgical robotic systems in precision tasks, albeit still human-in-the-loop technology controlled by surgeons. We also entrust them with social roles involving companionship and even assisting in intimate caregiving tasks (e.g., bathing, feeding, turning, medicine administration, monitoring, transporting). There have been advances to enable severely disabled persons to use robots to feed themselves or pilot robot avatars to work in service industries. As the applications for near-term AI increase and the roles of robots in restructuring our biomedical practices expand, we face pressing questions about the normative implications of human-robot interactions and collaborations in our collective worldmaking, as well as the moral and legal status of robots. This paper argues that robots operating in public and private spaces be afforded some protections as either moral patients or legal agents to establish prohibitions on robot abuse, misuse, and mistreatment. We already implement robots and embed them in our practices and institutions, which generates a host of human-to-machine and machine-to-machine relationships. As we interact with machines, whether in service contexts, medical assistance, or home health companions, these robots are first encountered in relationship to us and our respective roles in the encounter (e.g., surgeon, physical or occupational therapist, recipient of care, patient’s family, healthcare professional, stakeholder). This proposal aims to outline a framework for establishing limiting factors and determining the extent of moral or legal protections for robots. In doing so, it advocates for a relational approach that emphasizes the priority of mapping the complex contextually sensitive roles played and the relations in which humans and robots stand to guide policy determinations by relevant institutions and authorities. The relational approach must also be technically informed by the intended uses of the biomedical technologies in question, Design History Files, extensive risk assessments and hazard analyses, as well as use case social impact assessments.

Keywords: biomedical robots, robot ethics, robot laws, human-robot interaction

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