Search results for: Meeta Rajivlochan

Authors: Pratima Tatke, Archana Avhad, Bhanu Duggal, Meeta Rajivlochan, Sujata Saunik, Pradip Vyas, Nidhi Pandey, Aditee Dalvi, Jyothi Subramanian

Abstract:

Background: Smoking is well established risk factor for the development and progression of coronary artery disease. It is strongly related to morbidity and mortality from cardiovascular causes. The aim of this study is to observe effect of smoking status on percutaneous coronary intervention(PCI) after 1 year. Methods: 2527 patients who underwent PCI at different hospital of Maharashtra(India) from 2012 to 2015 under the health insurance scheme which is launched by Health department, Government of Maharashtra for below poverty line(BPL) families which covers cardiology. Informed consent of patients was taken .They were followed by telephonic survey after 6months to 1year of PCI . Outcomes of interest included myocardial infarction, restenosis, cardiac rehospitalization, death, and a composite of events after PCI. Made group of two non smokers-1861 and smokers (including patients who quit at time of PCI )-659. Results: Statistical Analysis using Pearson’s chi square test revealed that there was trend seen of increasing incidence of death, Myocardial infarction and Restenosis in smokers than non smokers .Smokers had a greater death risk compared to nonsmoker; 5.7% and 5.1% respectively p=0.518. Also Repeat procedures (2.1% vs. 1.5% p=0.222), breathlessness (17.8% vs. 18.20% p=0.1) and Myocardial Infarction (7.3% vs. 10%) high in smoker than non smokers. Conclusion: Major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE) were observed even after successful PCI in smokers. Patients undergoing percutaneous coronary intervention should be encouraged to stop smoking.

Keywords: coronary artery diseases, major adverse cardiovascular events, percutaneous coronary intervention, smoking

Procedia PDF Downloads 184

Authors: Meeta Ratawa Tiwary

Abstract:

Damaturu is the capital of Yobe State in northeastern Nigeria where civic amenities and facilities are not adequate even after 24 years of its existence. The volatile security and political situations are most significant causes for the same. The basic facility for the citizens in terms of drinking water and electricity are not available. For the drinking water, they have to rely on personal bore holes or the filtered borehole waters available in packaged sachets in the market. The present study is concerned with the environmental impact of indiscriminate disposal of drinking synthetic polythene water sachets in Damaturu. The sachet water is popularly called as ‘pure water’, but its purity is questionable. Increased production and consumption of sachet water has led to indiscriminate dumping and disposal of empty sachets leading to a serious environmental threat. The evidence of this is seen in the amount of disposed sachets littering the streets and also the drainages blocked by ‘blocks’ of water sachet waste. Sachet water gained much popularity in Nigeria because the product is convenient for use, affordable and economically viable. The present study aims to find out the solution to this environmental problem. The field-based study has found some significant factors that cause environmental and socio-economic effect due to this. Some recommendations have been made based on research findings regarding sustainable waste management, recycling and re-use of the non-biodegradable products in society.

Keywords: civic amenities, non-biodegradable, pure water, sustainable environment, waste disposal

Procedia PDF Downloads 399

Authors: Deepti Kohli, Meeta Keswani Mehra

Abstract:

The paper develops a theoretical model of electoral competition with purely opportunistic candidates and a uni-dimensional policy using the probability voting approach while focusing on the aspect of lobby formation to analyze the inherent complex interactions between centripetal and centrifugal forces and their effects on equilibrium policy platforms. There exist three types of agents, namely, Left-wing, Moderate and Right-wing who comprise of the total voting population. Also, it is assumed that the Left and Right agents are free to initiate a lobby of their choice. If initiated, these lobbies generate donations which in turn can be contributed to one (or both) electoral candidates in order to influence them to implement the lobby’s preferred policy. Four different lobby formation scenarios have been considered: no lobby formation, only Left, only Right and both Left and Right. The equilibrium policy platforms, amount of individual donations by agents to their respective lobbies and the contributions offered to the electoral candidates have been solved for under each of the above four cases. Since it is assumed that the agents cannot coordinate each other’s actions during the lobby formation stage, there exists a probability with which a lobby would be formed, which is also solved for in the model. The results indicate that the policy platforms of the two electoral candidates converge completely under the cases of no lobby and both (extreme) formations but diverge under the cases of only one (Left or Right) lobby formation. This is because in the case of no lobby being formed, only the centripetal forces (emerging from the election-winning aspect) are present while in the case of both extreme (Left-wing and Right-wing) lobbies being formed, centrifugal forces (emerging from the lobby formation aspect) also arise but cancel each other out, again resulting in a pure policy convergence phenomenon. In contrast, in case of only one lobby being formed, both centripetal and centrifugal forces interact strategically, leading the two electoral candidates to choose completely different policy platforms in equilibrium. Additionally, it is found that in equilibrium, while the donation by a specific agent type increases with the formation of both lobbies in comparison to when only one lobby is formed, the probability of implementation of the policy being advocated by that lobby group falls.

Keywords: electoral competition, equilibrium policy platforms, lobby formation, opportunistic candidates

Procedia PDF Downloads 313