Search results for: stackelberg

Authors: Hasibe Berfu Demi̇r, Şakir Esnaf

Abstract:

In the past decade, extensive improvements have been done in electrical grid infrastructures. It is very important to make plans on supply, demand, transmission, distribution and pricing for the development of the electricity energy sector. Based on this perspective, in this study, Stackelberg game approach is proposed for demand participation management (DRM), which has become an important component in the smart grid to effectively reduce power generation costs and user bills. The purpose of this study is to examine electricity consumption from a dynamic pricing perspective. The results obtained were compared with the current situation and the results were interpreted.

Keywords: lectricity, stackelberg, smart grid, demand response managment, dynamic pricing

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Authors: Violeta Damjanovic-Behrendt

Abstract:

This paper presents an approach for optimal cyber security decisions to protect instances of a federated Internet of Things (IoT) platform in the cloud. The presented solution implements the repeated Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) and a model called Stochastic Human behaviour model with AttRactiveness and Probability weighting (SHARP). SHARP employs the Subjective Utility Quantal Response (SUQR) for formulating a subjective utility function, which is based on the evaluations of alternative solutions during decision-making. We augment the repeated SSG (including SHARP and SUQR) with a reinforced learning algorithm called Naïve Q-Learning. Naïve Q-Learning belongs to the category of active and model-free Machine Learning (ML) techniques in which the agent (either the defender or the attacker) attempts to find an optimal security solution. In this way, we combine GT and ML algorithms for discovering optimal cyber security policies. The proposed security optimization components will be validated in a collaborative cloud platform that is based on the Industrial Internet Reference Architecture (IIRA) and its recently published security model.

Keywords: security, internet of things, cloud computing, stackelberg game, machine learning, naive q-learning

Procedia PDF Downloads 355

Authors: Mohammad Ebrahim Arbabian

Abstract:

This paper investigates the impact of 3D printing, also known as additive manufacturing, on a multi-item supply chain comprising a manufacturer and retailer. Operating under a wholesale-price contract and catering to stochastic customer demand, this study delves into the largely unexplored realm of how 3D printing technology reshapes supply chain dynamics. A distinguishing aspect of 3D printing is its versatility in producing various product types, yet its slower production pace compared to traditional methods poses a challenge. We analyze the trade-off between 3D printing's limited capacity and its enhancement of production flexibility. By delineating the economic circumstances favoring 3D printing adoption by the manufacturer, we establish the Stackelberg equilibrium in the retailer-manufacturer game. Additionally, we determine optimal order quantities for the retailer considering 3D printing as an option for the manufacturer, ascertain optimal wholesale prices in the presence of 3D printing, and compute optimal profits for both parties involved in the supply chain.

Keywords: additive manufacturing, supply chain management, contract theory, Stackelberg game, optimization

Procedia PDF Downloads 63

Authors: Birce Boga Bakirli

Abstract:

In this paper, we investigate ideas on human capital development and management in industries. We structured a model to be able to gather the data from the interviews conducted with worker, specialists and owners of companies. Different aspects of the situation are found in these interviews, and we used the information to model the benefit of the business owners and workers perspectives. These are modelled as a bi-level programming problem. Several instances of the generic cases are solved. The results show the importance of education within and out of the company for workers, and it returns for the company.

Keywords: bi-level programming, corporate strategy, cost tradeoffs, human capital, mixed integer programming, Stackelberg game, supplier relations, strategic planning

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Authors: Fuqiang Wang, Jun Liu, Liyan Cai

Abstract:

This paper investigates the coordination of the conflicting two-stage low carbon supply chain consisting of upstream and downstream manufacturers. The conflict means that the upstream manufacturer takes action for carbon emissions reduction under carbon trading mechanism while the downstream manufacturer’s production cost rises. It assumes for the Stackelberg game that the upstream manufacturer plays as a leader and the downstream manufacturer does as a follower. Four kinds of the situation of decentralized decision making, centralized decision-making, the production cost sharing contract and the carbon emissions reduction revenue sharing contract under decentralized decision making are considered. The backward induction approach is adopted to solve the game. The results show that the more intense the conflict is, the lower the efficiency of carbon emissions reduction and the higher the retail price is. The optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain under the two contracts is unchanged and still lower than that of the centralized supply chain. Both the production cost sharing contract and the carbon emissions reduction revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain, because that the sharing cost or carbon emissions reduction sharing revenue will transfer through the wholesale price mechanism. As a result, it requires more complicated contract forms to coordinate such a supply chain.

Keywords: cap-and-trade mechanism, carbon emissions reduction, conflict, supply chain coordination

Procedia PDF Downloads 340

Authors: Saied Farham-Nia, Alireza Ghaffari-Hadigheh

Abstract:

Game theory is a mathematical tool to study the behaviors of a rational and strategic decision-makers, that analyze existing equilibrium in interest conflict situation and provides an appropriate mechanisms for cooperation between two or more player. Game theory is applicable for any strategic and interest conflict situation in politics, management and economics, sociology and etc. Real worlds’ decisions are usually made in the state of indeterminacy and the players often are lack of the information about the other players’ payoffs or even his own, which leads to the games in uncertain environments. When historical data for decision parameters distribution estimation is unavailable, we may have no choice but to use expertise belief degree, which represents the strength with that we believe the event will happen. To deal with belief degrees, we have use uncertainty theory which is introduced and developed by Liu based on normality, duality, subadditivity and product axioms to modeling personal belief degree. As we know, the personal belief degree heavily depends on the personal knowledge concerning the event and when personal knowledge changes, cause changes in the belief degree too. Uncertainty theory not only theoretically is self-consistent but also is the best among other theories for modeling belief degree on practical problem. In this attempt, we primarily reintroduced Expected Utility Function in uncertainty environment according to uncertainty theory axioms to extract payoffs. Then, we employed Nash Equilibrium to investigate the solutions. For more practical issues, Stackelberg leader-follower Game and Bertrand Game, as a benchmark models are discussed. Compared to existing articles in the similar topics, the game models and solution concepts introduced in this article can be a framework for problems in an uncertain competitive situation based on experienced expert’s belief degree.

Keywords: game theory, uncertainty theory, belief degree, uncertain expected value, Nash equilibrium

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Authors: Mohammadreza Nematollahi, Bahareh Mosadegh Sedghy, Alireza Tajbakhsh

Abstract:

The last two decades have witnessed substantial attention to organic and sustainable agricultural supply chains. Motivated by real-world practices, this paper aims to address two main challenges observed in organic product supply chains: decentralized decision-making process between farmers and their retailers, and competition between organic products and their conventional counterparts. To this aim, an agricultural supply chain consisting of two farmers, a conventional farmer and an organic farmer who offers an organic version of the same product, is considered. Both farmers distribute their products through a single retailer, where there exists competition between the organic and the conventional product. The retailer, as the market leader, sets the wholesale price, and afterward, the farmers set their production quantity decisions. This paper first models the demand functions of the conventional and organic products by incorporating the effect of asymmetric brand equity, which captures the fact that consumers usually pay a premium for organic due to positive perceptions regarding their health and environmental benefits. Then, profit functions with consideration of some characteristics of organic farming, including crop yield gap and organic cost factor, are modeled. Our research also considers both economies and diseconomies of scale in farming production as well as the effects of organic subsidy paid by the government to support organic farming. This paper explores the investigated supply chain in three scenarios: decentralized, centralized, and coordinated decision-making structures. In the decentralized scenario, the conventional and organic farmers and the retailer maximize their own profits individually. In this case, the interaction between the farmers is modeled under the Bertrand competition, while analyzing the interaction between the retailer and farmers under the Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model, the optimal production strategies are obtained from the entire supply chain perspective. Analytical models are developed to derive closed-form optimal solutions. Moreover, analytical sensitivity analyses are conducted to explore the effects of main parameters like the crop yield gap, organic cost factor, organic subsidy, and percent price premium of the organic product on the farmers’ and retailer’s optimal strategies. Afterward, a coordination scenario is proposed to convince the three supply chain members to shift from the decentralized to centralized decision-making structure. The results indicate that the proposed coordination scenario provides a win-win-win situation for all three members compared to the decentralized model. Moreover, our paper demonstrates that the coordinated model respectively increases and decreases the production and price of organic produce, which in turn motivates the consumption of organic products in the market. Moreover, the proposed coordination model helps the organic farmer better handle the challenges of organic farming, including the additional cost and crop yield gap. Last but not least, our results highlight the active role of the organic subsidy paid by the government as a means of promoting sustainable organic product supply chains. Our paper shows that although the amount of organic subsidy plays a significant role in the production and sales price of organic products, the allocation method of subsidy between the organic farmer and retailer is not of that importance.

Keywords: analytical game-theoretic model, product competition, supply chain coordination, sustainable organic supply chain

Procedia PDF Downloads 112