Search results for: satisficing

Authors: Okay Gunes

Abstract:

Unsatisfactory experiences due to an information shortage regarding the future pay-offs of actual choices, yield satisficing decision-making. This research will examine, for the first time in the literature, the motivation behind suboptimal decisions due to uncertainty by subjecting Adam Smith’s and Jeremy Bentham’s assumptions about the nature of the actions that lead to satisficing behavior, in order to clarify the theoretical background of a “consumption-based satisfactory time” concept. The contribution of this paper with respect to the existing literature is threefold: Firstly, it is showed in this paper that Adam Smith’s uncertainty is related to the problem of the constancy of ideas and not related directly to beliefs. Secondly, possessions, as in Jeremy Bentham’s oeuvre, are assumed to be just as pleasing, as protecting and improving the actual or expected quality of life, so long as they reduce any displeasure due to the undesired outcomes of uncertainty. Finally, each consumption decision incurs its own satisfactory time period, owed to not feeling hungry, being healthy, not having transportation…etc. This reveals that the level of satisfaction is indeed a behavioral phenomenon where its value would depend on the simultaneous satisfaction derived from all activities.

Keywords: decision-making, idea and belief, satisficing, uncertainty

Procedia PDF Downloads 255

Authors: Herbert W. Corley

Abstract:

A scalar equilibrium (SE) is an alternative type of equilibrium in pure strategies for an n-person normal-form game G. It is defined using optimization techniques to obtain a pure strategy for each player of G by maximizing an appropriate utility function over the acceptable joint actions. The players’ actions are determined by the choice of the utility function. Such a utility function could be agreed upon by the players or chosen by an arbitrator. An SE is an equilibrium since no players of G can increase the value of this utility function by changing their strategies. SEs are formally defined, and examples are given. In a greedy SE, the goal is to assign actions to the players giving them the largest individual payoffs jointly possible. In a weighted SE, each player is assigned weights modeling the degree to which he helps every player, including himself, achieve as large a payoff as jointly possible. In a compromise SE, each player wants a fair payoff for a reasonable interpretation of fairness. In a parity SE, the players want their payoffs to be as nearly equal as jointly possible. Finally, a satisficing SE achieves a personal target payoff value for each player. The vector payoffs associated with each of these SEs are shown to be Pareto optimal among all such acceptable vectors, as well as computationally tractable.

Keywords: compromise equilibrium, greedy equilibrium, normal-form game, parity equilibrium, pure strategies, satisficing equilibrium, scalar equilibria, utility function, weighted equilibrium

Procedia PDF Downloads 90

Authors: Robin Molinier

Abstract:

Industrial symbiosis (I.S) deals with both substitution synergies (exchange of waste materials, fatal energy and utilities as resources for production) and infrastructure/service sharing synergies. The latter is based on the intensification of use of an asset and thus requires to balance capital costs increments with snowball effects (network externalities) for its implementation. Initial investors must specify ex-ante arrangements (cost sharing and pricing schedule) to commit toward investments in capacities and transactions. Our model investigate the decision of 2 actors trying to choose cooperatively a level of infrastructure capacity oversizing to set a plug-and-play offer to a potential entrant whose capacity requirement is randomly distributed while satisficing their own requirements. Capacity cost exhibits sub-additive property so that there is room for profitable overcapacity setting in the first period. The entrant’s willingness-to-pay for the access to the infrastructure is dependent upon its standalone cost and the capacity gap that it must complete in case the available capacity is insufficient ex-post (the complement cost). Since initial capacity choices are driven by ex-ante (expected) yield extractible from the entrant we derive the expected complement cost function which helps us defining the investors’ objective function. We first show that this curve is decreasing and convex in the capacity increments and that it is shaped by the distribution function of the potential entrant’s requirements. We then derive the general form of solutions and solve the model for uniform and triangular distributions. Depending on requirements volumes and cost assumptions different equilibria occurs. We finally analyze the effect of a per-unit subsidy a public actor would apply to foster such sharing synergies.

Keywords: capacity, cooperation, industrial symbiosis, pricing

Procedia PDF Downloads 183