Search results for: enactivism

Authors: S. Alina Wang

Abstract:

A Gibsonian approach is used to understand the existential dimensions of the human ecological niche. Then, this existential-Gibsonian framework is applied to rethinking Hacking’s historical analysis of multiple personality disorder. This research culminates in a generalized account of psychiatric illness from an enactivist lens. In conclusion, reflections on the implications of this account on approaches to psychiatric treatment are mentioned. J.J. Gibson’s theory of affordances centered on affordances of sensorimotor varieties, which guide basic behaviors relative to organisms’ vital needs and physiological capacities (1979). Later theorists, notably Neisser (1988) and Rietveld (2014), expanded on the theory of affordances to account for uniquely human activities relative to the emotional, intersubjective, cultural, and narrative aspects of the human ecological niche. This research shows that these affordances are structured by what Haugeland (1998) calls existential commitments, which draws on Heidegger’s notion of dasein (1927) and Merleau-Ponty’s account of existential freedom (1945). These commitments organize the existential affordances that fill an individual’s environment and guide their thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. This system of a priori existential commitments and a posteriori affordances is called existential enactivism. For humans, affordances do not only elicit motor responses and appear as objects with instrumental significance. Affordances also, and possibly primarily, determine so-called affective and cognitive activities and structure the wide range of kinds (e.g., instrumental, aesthetic, ethical) of significances of objects found in the world. Then existential enactivism is applied to understanding the psychiatric phenomenon of multiple personality disorder (precursor of the current diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder). A reinterpretation of Hacking’s (1998) insights into the history of this particular disorder and his generalizations on the constructed nature of most psychiatric illness is taken on. Enactivist approaches sensitive to existential phenomenology can provide a deeper understanding of these matters. Conceptualizing psychiatric illness as strictly a disorder in the head (whether parsed as a disorder of brain chemicals or meaning-making capacities encoded in psychological modules) is incomplete. Rather, psychiatric illness must also be understood as a disorder in the world, or in the interconnected networks of existential affordances that regulate one’s emotional, intersubjective, and narrative capacities. All of this suggests that an adequate account of psychiatric illness must involve (1) the affordances that are the sources of existential hindrance, (2) the existential commitments structuring these affordances, and (3) the conditions of these existential commitments. Approaches to treatment of psychiatric illness would be more effective by centering on the interruption of normalized behaviors corresponding to affordances targeted as sources of hindrance, the development of new existential commitments, and the practice of new behaviors that erect affordances relative to these reformed commitments.

Keywords: affordance, enaction, phenomenology, psychiatry, psychopathology

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Authors: Laura Bickel

Abstract:

This paper aims to investigate to what extent Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of body memory serves as a viable resource for the enactive approach to cognitive science and its first-person experience-based research on ‘recurrent depressive disorder’ coded F33 in ICD-10. In pursuit of this goal, the analysis begins by revisiting the neuroreductive paradigm. This paradigm serves biological psychiatry to explain the condition of vital contact in terms of underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. It is demonstrated that the neuroreductive model cannot sufficiently account for the depressed person’s episodical withdrawal in causal terms. The analysis of the irregular loss of vital resonance requires integrating the body as the subject of experience and its phenomenological time. Then, it is shown that the enactive approach to depression as disordered sense-making is a promising alternative. The enactive model of perception implies that living beings do not register pre-existing meaning ‘out there’ but unfold ‘sense’ in their action-oriented response to the world. For the enactive approach, Husserl’s passive synthesis of inner time consciousness is fundamental for what becomes perceptually present for action. It seems intuitive to bring together the enactive approach to depression with the long-standing view in phenomenological psychopathology that explains the loss of vital contact by appealing to the disruption of the temporal structure of consciousness. However, this paper argues that the disruption of the temporal structure is not justified conceptually. Instead, one may integrate Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the past as the unconscious into the enactive approach to depression. From this perspective, the living being’s experiential and biological past inserts itself in the form of habit and bodily skills and ensures action-oriented responses to the environment. Finally, it is concluded that the depressed person’s withdrawal indicates the impairment of this application process. The person suffering from F33 cannot actualize sedimented meaning to respond to the valences and tasks of a given situation.

Keywords: depression, enactivism, neuroreductionsim, phenomenology, temporality

Procedia PDF Downloads 113