Search results for: emergentism
Commenced in January 2007
Frequency: Monthly
Edition: International
Paper Count: 4

Search results for: emergentism

4 Trends of Code-Mixing in a Bilingual Nigerian Child: An Investigation of a Three-Year-Old Child

Authors: Salamatu Sani

Abstract:

This study is an investigation of how code-mixing manifests in the language development of a Nigerian child, especially in the Hausa speaking environment. It is hinged on the fact that the environment influences the first language acquired by a child regardless of the cultural and/or linguistic background of the parents. The child under investigation has been subjected to close monitoring on her speech hitherto. It is a longitudinal study covering a period of twelve months (January 2018 to December 2018); that was when the subject was between twenty-four and thirty months of age. The speeches have been recorded by means of a tape recorder, video, and a diary. The study employs as a theoretical framework, emergentism, which is an eclectic of the behaviourist and the mentalist theories to the study of language development, for analysis. This is in agreement with the positions of Skinner and Watson. Sequel to this investigation, it was discovered the environment is a major factor that influences the exposure of a child to a language more than the other factors and that, if a child is exposed to more than one language, there is a great tendency for such a child to code-mix and code-switch in her speech production. The child under investigation, in spite of the linguistic background of her parents, speaks the Hausa Language much better than the other languages around her though with remarkable code-mixing with other languages around her such as English and Ebira languages. The study concludes that although a child is born with the innate ability to acquire a particular language, the environment plays a key role to trigger the innate ability and consequently, the child is exposed to the acquisition of the dominant language around her at a particular given time.

Keywords: bilingual, code-mixing, emergentism, environment, Hausa

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3 Analyzing the Emergence of Conscious Phenomena by the Process-Based Metaphysics

Authors: Chia-Lin Tu

Abstract:

Towards the end of the 20th century, a reductive picture has dominated in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Reductive physicalism claims that all entities and properties in this world are eventually able to be reduced to the physical level. It means that all phenomena in the world are able to be explained by laws of physics. However, quantum physics provides another picture. It says that the world is undergoing change and the energy of change is, in fact, the most important part to constitute world phenomena. Quantum physics provides us another point of view to reconsider the reality of the world. Throughout the history of philosophy of mind, reductive physicalism tries to reduce the conscious phenomena to physical particles as well, meaning that the reality of consciousness is composed by physical particles. However, reductive physicalism is unable to explain conscious phenomena and mind-body causation. Conscious phenomena, e.g., qualia, is not composed by physical particles. The current popular theory for consciousness is emergentism. Emergentism is an ambiguous concept which has not had clear idea of how conscious phenomena are emerged by physical particles. In order to understand the emergence of conscious phenomena, it seems that quantum physics is an appropriate analogy. Quantum physics claims that physical particles and processes together construct the most fundamental field of world phenomena, and thus all natural processes, i.e., wave functions, have occurred within. The traditional space-time description of classical physics is overtaken by the wave-function story. If this methodology of quantum physics works well to explain world phenomena, then it is not necessary to describe the world by the idea of physical particles like classical physics did. Conscious phenomena are one kind of world phenomena. Scientists and philosophers have tried to explain the reality of them, but it has not come out any conclusion. Quantum physics tells us that the fundamental field of the natural world is processed metaphysics. The emergence of conscious phenomena is only possible within this process metaphysics and has clearly occurred. By the framework of quantum physics, we are able to take emergence more seriously, and thus we can account for such emergent phenomena as consciousness. By questioning the particle-mechanistic concept of the world, the new metaphysics offers an opportunity to reconsider the reality of conscious phenomena.

Keywords: quantum physics, reduction, emergence, qualia

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2 The Postcognitivist Era in Cognitive Psychology

Authors: C. Jameke

Abstract:

During the cognitivist era in cognitive psychology, a theory of internal rules and symbolic representations was posited as an account of human cognition. This type of cognitive architecture had its heyday during the 1970s and 80s, but it has now been largely abandoned in favour of subsymbolic architectures (e.g. connectionism), non-representational frameworks (e.g. dynamical systems theory), and statistical approaches such as Bayesian theory. In this presentation I describe this changing landscape of research, and comment on the increasing influence of neuroscience on cognitive psychology. I then briefly review a few recent developments in connectionism, and neurocomputation relevant to cognitive psychology, and critically discuss the assumption made by some researchers in these frameworks that higher-level aspects of human cognition are simply emergent properties of massively large distributed neural networks

Keywords: connectionism, emergentism, postocgnitivist, representations, subsymbolic archiitecture

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1 An Emergentist Defense of Incompatibility between Morally Significant Freedom and Causal Determinism

Authors: Lubos Rojka

Abstract:

The common perception of morally responsible behavior is that it presupposes freedom of choice, and that free decisions and actions are not determined by natural events, but by a person. In other words, the moral agent has the ability and the possibility of doing otherwise when making morally responsible decisions, and natural causal determinism cannot fully account for morally significant freedom. The incompatibility between a person’s morally significant freedom and causal determinism appears to be a natural position. Nevertheless, some of the most influential philosophical theories on moral responsibility are compatibilist or semi-compatibilist, and they exclude the requirement of alternative possibilities, which contradicts the claims of classical incompatibilism. The compatibilists often employ Frankfurt-style thought experiments to prove their theory. The goal of this paper is to examine the role of imaginary Frankfurt-style examples in compatibilist accounts. More specifically, the compatibilist accounts defended by John Martin Fischer and Michael McKenna will be inserted into the broader understanding of a person elaborated by Harry Frankfurt, Robert Kane and Walter Glannon. Deeper analysis reveals that the exclusion of alternative possibilities based on Frankfurt-style examples is problematic and misleading. A more comprehensive account of moral responsibility and morally significant (source) freedom requires higher order complex theories of human will and consciousness, in which rational and self-creative abilities and a real possibility to choose otherwise, at least on some occasions during a lifetime, are necessary. Theoretical moral reasons and their logical relations seem to require a sort of higher-order agent-causal incompatibilism. The ability of theoretical or abstract moral reasoning requires complex (strongly emergent) mental and conscious properties, among which an effective free will, together with first and second-order desires. Such a hierarchical theoretical model unifies reasons-responsiveness, mesh theory and emergentism. It is incompatible with physical causal determinism, because such determinism only allows non-systematic processes that may be hard to predict, but not complex (strongly) emergent systems. An agent’s effective will and conscious reflectivity is the starting point of a morally responsible action, which explains why a decision is 'up to the subject'. A free decision does not always have a complete causal history. This kind of an emergentist source hyper-incompatibilism seems to be the best direction of the search for an adequate explanation of moral responsibility in the traditional (merit-based) sense. Physical causal determinism as a universal theory would exclude morally significant freedom and responsibility in the traditional sense because it would exclude the emergence of and supervenience by the essential complex properties of human consciousness.

Keywords: consciousness, free will, determinism, emergence, moral responsibility

Procedia PDF Downloads 128