Search results for: constitutionality

Authors: Fethia Braik

Abstract:

This paper summarizes the history of the US Supreme Court. It did not enjoy today’s status. It did neither control legislation nor the executive power. It was until 1803, during Marshall’s term, that it gained the pride of ruling over the constitutionality of acts be they federal or local, congressional or presidential. The Chief Justice, whether intended or not, vested such power in the supreme judicial institution via the case of Marbury v. Madison. Such power, nevertheless, had not been exercised for many years, till the Dred Scott case.

Keywords: Judiciary Acts 1789, 1801, chief justice, associate justice, justice of peace, review of constitutionality of acts, Jay court, Ellsworth court, Marshall court

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Authors: Alphonso Goliath

Abstract:

With mandatory minimum sentences, even with its qualification of “substantial and compelling circumstances”, the sentence severity for violent crimes has increased substantially to combat crime. Considering the upsurge in violent crime, the paper argues that minimum sentences failed to prevent or curb violent crime. These sentences deprive offenders more than what is reasonably necessary of their freedom to curb the offense and punish the offender. Minimum sentences amount to cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment unjustified and vulnerable to constitutional challenge.

Keywords: constitutionality, deterrence, incapacitation, minimum sentencing legislation, prison overcrowding, rehabilitation, recidivism, retribution, violent crime

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Authors: Alphonso Augustine Goliath

Abstract:

In 1997 South Africa adopted legislation introducing severe mandatory minimum sentences. This was a political response to counter the escalating violent crime the country experienced when it transitioned to democracy. Despite minimum sentences being fully operational for more than two decades, violent crimes like murder and rape have not abated. This paper provides a critique of the efficacy of minimums sentences with a primary focus on the legislation’s main aim of preventing or curbing crime, its relationship with prison overcrowding, and its continued constitutionality.

Keywords: constitutionality, deterrence, incapacitation, minimum sentencing legislation, prison overcrowding, rehabilitation, recidivism, retribution, violent crime

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Authors: Masnur Marzuki

Abstract:

As in other democratic countries, the constitutional court of Indonesia has the role of interpreting and applying the Constitution in order to preserve its supremacy testing the constitutionality of statutes. With its strong power to enforce and guard the Constitution, the court is now challenged to provide people an opportunity to understand their constitutional rights close up. At the same time, the court has built up an enviable reputation among constitutional courts in new democracies for the technical quality of its legitimacy in the legal sense. Since its establishment in 2003, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia has decided more than 190 statutes in judicial review case. It has been remarkably successful to make a credible start on its work of guarding the Constitution. Unsurprisingly, many argue that the Court has elevated Indonesia’s democracy to a whole new level. In accomplishing its roles judicial review, the basic principle that can be identified is that the Constitutional Court must always be subordinated to the Constitution. It is not being allowed to invade the field of the legislator. In doing so, the court does not have any discretionary political basis in order to create legal norms or provisions that could not be deducted from the Constitution itself. When interpreting a statute “in accordance with the constitution”, the court recognizes and reasserts that it is strictly forbidden to extend the scope of a legal provision in such a way that would create a general norm not established by the law-maker. This paper aims to identify and assess the latest role of Indonesian Constitutional Court in interpreting and applying the Constitution. In particular, it questions 1) the role of the Constitutional Court in judicial review; and 2) the role of the court to assist the legislators in the accomplishment of their functions in order to preserve its supremacy testing the constitutionality of statutes. Concerning positive legislator, jurisprudential and judicial review theories will be approached. The empirical part will include qualitative and comparative research. Main questions to be addressed: Can the Constitutional Court be functionalized as positive legislator? What are the criteria for conducting role of Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators and how can it be accepted? Concerning the subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution and judicial review, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be used, and differences between Indonesia and German Constitutional Court will be observed. Other questions to be addressed: Can Constitutional Courts have any discretionary political basis in order to create legal norms or provisions that could not be deducted from the Constitution itself. Should the Constitutional Court always act as a negative legislator? However, the Constitutional Court in Indonesia has played role as positive legislators which create dynamic of Indonesian legal development. In performing the task of reviewing the constitutionality of statutes, the Constitutional Court has created legal norms or provisions that could be deducted from the Constitution itself.

Keywords: constitution, court, law, rights

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Authors: Chintan Chandrachud

Abstract:

When primary legislation is challenged for breaching fundamental rights, many courts around the world adopt interpretive techniques to avoid finding such legislation incompatible or invalid. In the UK, these techniques find sanction in section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which directs courts to interpret legislation in a manner which is compatible with European Convention rights, ‘so far as it is possible to do so’. In India, courts begin with the interpretive presumption that Parliament intended to comply with fundamental rights under the Constitution of 1949. In comparing rights-compliant interpretation of primary legislation under the Human Rights Act and the Indian Constitution, this paper makes two arguments. First, that in the absence of a section 3-type mandate, Indian courts have a smaller range of interpretive tools at their disposal in interpreting primary legislation in a way which complies with fundamental rights. For example, whereas British courts frequently read words into statutes, Indian courts consider this an inapposite interpretive technique. The second argument flows naturally from the first. Given that Indian courts have a smaller interpretive toolbox, one would imagine that ceteris paribus, Indian courts’ power to strike down legislation would be triggered earlier than the declaration of incompatibility is in the UK. However, this is not borne out in practice. Faced with primary legislation which appears to violate fundamental rights, Indian courts often reluctantly uphold the constitutionality of statutes (rather than striking them down), as opposed to British courts, which make declarations of incompatibility. The explanation for this seeming asymmetry hinges on the difference between the ‘strike down’ power and the declaration of incompatibility. Whereas the former results in the disapplication of a statute, the latter throws the ball back into Parliament’s court, if only formally.

Keywords: constitutional law, judicial review, constitution of India, UK Human Rights Act

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Authors: Roy Alex, Dr. Shampa I Dev

Abstract:

Abstract Nine out of twenty-eight states in India have enacted anti-conversion laws to regulate religious conversions by use of force, allurement, inducement, or fraudulent means. The vagueness of the definitions of the terms used in these laws makes them inconsistent with the provisions of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution. It is a critical question whether these laws protect the religious freedom of groups that are “vulnerable” to missionary inducements, or are they restricting the freedom of citizens to propagate their religion to others or change their religious identity? This article looks into the constitutionality of the anti-conversion laws passed in the Indian States and argues that these laws limit the freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. The ambiguity in the anti-conversion laws passed in various states of India is brought out by critically analyzing multiple cases charged under anti-conversion laws.

Keywords: Freedom of Religion, Anti-conversion Laws, allurement, inducement, and fraudulent means.

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Authors: Chukwuemeka Castro Nwabuzor

Abstract:

The 2015 Administration of Criminal Justice Act in Nigeria clearly sets out conditions for bail for felonies, lesser offenses and capital offenses. Even where the conditions for bail are met, granting an application for bail is not automatic as it is subject to the discretion of the court. Where the court, however, grants bail to an accused, the detaining authority which usually is the executive arm of government is bound to comply with the order of the court. This paper discusses the constitutionality of the continued detention of criminal suspects in disobedience to an order of the court and in the absence of an appeal. Particularly, the paper looks at the rights to personal liberty, the dignity of the human person and also the presumption of innocence which remains one of the crucial pillars of our criminal jurisprudence. The paper analyses the reasons posed by the executive for the continued detention of a suspect including State security and security of the suspect and questions whether the reasons are reasonable justifiable in a constitutional democratic society and whether they breach the principles of separation of powers. The paper concludes that the continued detention criminal of suspects in disobedience to court orders constitutes contempt of court and dishonours the principles of separation of powers enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. This paper makes a strong case for the donation of more enforceable powers to the judiciary particularly with regards to the granting of compensation orders against the executive and ensuring compliance by the executive to bail orders.

Keywords: breach of fundamental rights, contempt of court, discretion of court, right to bail, separation of powers

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Authors: Charles A. Khamala

Abstract:

In 2003, constrained by an absent “rule of law culture” and negative economic growth, the new Kenyan government chose to pursue incremental judicial reforms rather than comprehensive constitutional reforms. President Mwai Kibaki’s first administration’s judicial reform strategy was two pronged. First, to implement unprecedented “radical surgery,” he appointed a new Chief Justice who instrumentally recommended that half the purportedly-corrupt judiciary should be removed by Presidential tribunals of inquiry. Second, the replacement High Court judges, initially, instrumentally-endorsed the “radical surgery’s” administrative decisions removing their corrupt predecessors. Meanwhile, retention of the welfare-reducing Constitution perpetuated declining public confidence in judicial institutions culminating in refusal by the dissatisfied opposition party to petition the disputed 2007 presidential election results, alleging biased and corrupt courts. Fatefully, widespread post-election violence ensued. Consequently, the international community prompted the second Kibaki administration to concede to a new Constitution. Suddenly, the High Court then adopted a non-instrumental interpretation to reject the 2003 “radical surgery.” This paper therefore critically analyzes whether the Kenyan court’s inconsistent interpretations–pertaining to the constitutionality of the 2003 “radical surgery” removing corruption from Kenya’s courts–was predicated on political expediency or human rights principles. If justice “must also seen to be done,” then pursuit of the CJ’s, Judicial Service Commission’s and president’s political or economic interests must be limited by respect for the suspected judges and magistrates’ due process rights. The separation of powers doctrine demands that the dismissed judges should have a right of appeal which entails impartial review by a special independent oversight mechanism. Instead, ignoring fundamental rights, Kenya’s new Supreme Court’s interpretation of another round of vetting under the new 2010 Constitution, ousts the High Court’s judicial review jurisdiction altogether, since removal of judicial corruption is “a constitutional imperative, akin to a national duty upon every judicial officer to pave way for judicial realignment and reformulation.”

Keywords: administrative decisions, corruption, fair hearing, judicial review, (non) instrumental

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