Evaluating the Impact of Judicial Review of 2003 “Radical Surgery” Purging Corrupt Officials from Kenyan Courts

Authors: Charles A. Khamala

Abstract:

In 2003, constrained by an absent “rule of law culture” and negative economic growth, the new Kenyan government chose to pursue incremental judicial reforms rather than comprehensive constitutional reforms. President Mwai Kibaki’s first administration’s judicial reform strategy was two pronged. First, to implement unprecedented “radical surgery,” he appointed a new Chief Justice who instrumentally recommended that half the purportedly-corrupt judiciary should be removed by Presidential tribunals of inquiry. Second, the replacement High Court judges, initially, instrumentally-endorsed the “radical surgery’s” administrative decisions removing their corrupt predecessors. Meanwhile, retention of the welfare-reducing Constitution perpetuated declining public confidence in judicial institutions culminating in refusal by the dissatisfied opposition party to petition the disputed 2007 presidential election results, alleging biased and corrupt courts. Fatefully, widespread post-election violence ensued. Consequently, the international community prompted the second Kibaki administration to concede to a new Constitution. Suddenly, the High Court then adopted a non-instrumental interpretation to reject the 2003 “radical surgery.” This paper therefore critically analyzes whether the Kenyan court’s inconsistent interpretations–pertaining to the constitutionality of the 2003 “radical surgery” removing corruption from Kenya’s courts–was predicated on political expediency or human rights principles. If justice “must also seen to be done,” then pursuit of the CJ’s, Judicial Service Commission’s and president’s political or economic interests must be limited by respect for the suspected judges and magistrates’ due process rights. The separation of powers doctrine demands that the dismissed judges should have a right of appeal which entails impartial review by a special independent oversight mechanism. Instead, ignoring fundamental rights, Kenya’s new Supreme Court’s interpretation of another round of vetting under the new 2010 Constitution, ousts the High Court’s judicial review jurisdiction altogether, since removal of judicial corruption is “a constitutional imperative, akin to a national duty upon every judicial officer to pave way for judicial realignment and reformulation.”

Keywords: administrative decisions, corruption, fair hearing, judicial review, (non) instrumental