Commenced in January 2007
Frequency: Monthly
Edition: International
Paper Count: 2

Search results for: S. Avdasheva

2 Price Regulation in Domestic Market: Incentives to Collude in the Deregulated Market

Authors: S. Avdasheva, D. Tsytsulina

Abstract:

In many regulated industries over the world price cap as a method of price regulation replaces cost-plus pricing. It is a kind of incentive regulation introduced in order to enhance productive efficiency by strengthening sellers’ incentives for cost reduction as well as incentives for more efficient pricing. However pricing under cap is not neutral for competition in the market. We consider influence on competition on the markets where benchmark for cap is chosen from when sellers are multi-market. We argue that the impact of price cap regulation on market competition depends on the design of cap. More specifically if cap for one (regulated) market depends on the price of the supplier in other (non-regulated) market, there is sub-type of price cap regulation (known in Russian tariff regulation as ‘netback minus’) that enhance incentives to collude in non-regulated market.

Keywords: price regulation, competition, collusion

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1 Does Citizens’ Involvement Always Improve Outcomes: Procedures, Incentives and Comparative Advantages of Public and Private Law Enforcement

Authors: Avdasheva Svetlanaa, Kryuchkova Polinab

Abstract:

Comparative social efficiency of private and public enforcement of law is debated. This question is not of academic interest only, it is also important for the development of the legal system and regulations. Generally, involvement of ‘common citizens’ in public law enforcement is considered to be beneficial, while involvement of interest groups representatives is not. Institutional economics as well as law and economics consider the difference between public and private enforcement to be rather mechanical. Actions of bureaucrats in government agencies are assumed to be driven by the incentives linked to social welfare (or other indicator of public interest) and their own benefits. In contrast, actions of participants in private enforcement are driven by their private benefits. However administrative law enforcement may be designed in such a way that it would become driven mainly by individual incentives of alleged victims. We refer to this system as reactive public enforcement. Citizens may prefer using reactive public enforcement even if private enforcement is available. However replacement of public enforcement by reactive version of public enforcement negatively affects deterrence and reduces social welfare. We illustrate the problem of private vs pure public and private vs reactive public enforcement models with the examples of three legislation subsystems in Russia – labor law, consumer protection law and competition law. While development of private enforcement instead of public (especially in reactive public model) is desirable, replacement of both public and private enforcement by reactive model is definitely not.

Keywords: public enforcement, private complaints, legal errors, competition protection, labor law, competition law, russia

Procedia PDF Downloads 387