Search results for: Qiuwen Ma

Authors: Qiuwen Ma, Sai On Cheung

Abstract:

Incentive contracting has been developed to push the agent team for extra effort. Generally, there are three types of incentive arrangement, namely incentive/penalty for super performance/underperformance, risk/reward sharing and future business opportunities. It is found that there are significant differences in the use of incentive arrangement in private and public projects. In Hong Kong, very few public projects have used future business as incentivizer whereas private developers often signal repeated business coupled with heavy penalty. This study was conducted to identify various attributes affecting the use of I/D in both private and public engineering sectors of Hong Kong. The diverging preferences were unveiled with reference to a literature review and semi-structured interviews with industry experts. The findings reveal the public/private sectors would consider the implementation issues regarding the various performance targets. The most deterministic factor for the public sector is about accountability. The private sector is in general skeptical about the need to provide extra for the contractors for what they have already contracted to perform.

Keywords: construction incentive, public/private projects, semi-structured interview, hong kong

Procedia PDF Downloads 58

Authors: Sai On Cheung, Qiuwen Ma, Fong Chung Lee

Abstract:

Due to increased project complexity and technological advancement in the last decade, the designers and contractors are expected to put more efforts to achieve project goals. To render extra efforts from the agents, incentivization has become one of the primary strategies for the client. Despite increased academia interest in the design of incentive strategies, there is still a need for discussion about the underlying motivations and favourable conditions to make incentives effective. Therefore, this study focuses on the effects of motivations and favourable conditions for the use of incentives in public projects. Questionnaire survey is used as the data collection tool. The questionnaire survey was piloted through interviews with professionals from Hong Kong public sector. A total of 100 responses were collected for this survey. Accountability and organizational effectiveness were found to be the prime objectives of incentives installed by public clients. Furthermore, a list of favourable conditions for incentivization and its consequent effects on cost, schedule, risk and public opinions were identified. To conclude, this study analyses the means and ends of the use of incentives in public projects in Hong Kong.

Keywords: incentives, public accountability, project effectiveness, public opinions

Procedia PDF Downloads 33

Authors: Shan Li, Qiuwen Ma

Abstract:

Integrated project delivery (IPD) is a project delivery method distinguished by a shared risk/rewards mechanism and multiparty agreement. IPD has drawn increasingly attention from construction industry because of its efficiency of solving adversarial problems and reliability to deliver high-performing buildings. However, some evidence showed that some project participants obtained less profit from IPD projects than the typical projects. They attributed it to the unfair IPD sharing mechanism, which resulted in additional time and cost of negotiation on the sharing fractions among project participants. The study is aimed to investigate the reward distribution by constructing a principal-agent model. Based on cooperative game theory, it is examined how to distribute the shared project rewards between client and non-client parties, and identify the sharing fractions among non-client parties. It is found that at least half of the project savings should be allocated to the non-client parties to motivate them to create more project value. Second, the client should raise his sharing fractions when the integration among project participants is efficient. In addition, the client should allocate higher sharing fractions to the non-client party who is more able. This study can help the IPD project participants make fair and motivated sharing mechanisms.

Keywords: cooperative game theory, IPD, principal agent model, sharing mechanism

Procedia PDF Downloads 261

Authors: Shan Li, Qiuwen Ma

Abstract:

Integrated project delivery (IPD) is a project delivery method distinguished by a shared risk/rewards mechanism and multiparty agreement. IPD has drawn increasing attention from construction industry due to its reliability to deliver high-performing buildings. However, unavailable IPD specific insurance concerns the industry participants who are interested in IPD implementation. Even though the risk management capability can be enhanced using shared risk mechanism, some risks may occur when the partners do not commit themselves into the integrated practices in a desired manner. This is because the intense collaboration and close integration can not only create added value but bring new opportunistic behaviors and disputes. The study is aimed to investigate the risks of implementing IPD using Bayesian theory. IPD risk taxonomy is presented to identify all potential risks of implementing IPD and a risk network map is developed to capture the interdependencies between IPD risks. The conditional relations between risk occurrences and the impacts of IPD risks on project performances are evaluated and simulated based on Bayesian theory. The probability of project outcomes is predicted by simulation. In addition, it is found that some risks caused by integration are most possible occurred risks. This study can help the IPD project participants identify critical risks of adopting IPD to improve project performances. In addition, it is helpful to develop IPD specific insurance when the pertinent risks can be identified.

Keywords: Bayesian theory, integrated project delivery, project risks, project performances

Procedia PDF Downloads 263