IIROC's Enforcement Performance: Funnel in, Funnel out, and Funnel away

Authors: Mark Lokanan

Abstract:

The paper analyzes the processing of complaints against investment brokers and dealer members through the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) from 2008 to 2017. IIROC is the self-regulatory organization (SRO) that is responsible for policing investment dealers and brokerage firms that trade in Canada’s securities market. Data from the study came from IIROC's enforcement annual reports for the years examined. The case processing is evaluated base on the misconduct funnel that was originally designed for street crime and applies to the enforcement of investment fraud. The misconduct funnel is used as a framework to examine IIROC’s claim that it brought in more complaints (funnel in) than government regulators and shows how these complaints are funneled out and funneled away as they are processed through IIROC’s enforcement system. The results indicate that IIROC is ineffective in disciplining its members and is unable to handle the more serious quasi-criminal and improper sales practices offenses. It is hard not to see the results of the paper being used by the legislator in Ottawa to show the importance of a federal securities regulatory agency such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States.

Keywords: investment fraud, securities regulation, compliance, enforcement