The Exercise of Deliberative Democracy on Public Administrations Agencies' Decisions

Authors: Mauricio Filho, Carina Castro

Abstract:

The object of this project is to analyze long-time public agents that passed through several governments and see themselves in the position of having to deliberate with new agents, recently settled in the public administration. For theoretical ends, internal deliberation is understood as the one practiced on the public administration agencies, without any direct participation from the general public in the process. The assumption is: agents with longer periods of public service tend to step away from momentary political discussions that guide the current administration and seek to concentrate on institutionalized routines and procedures, making the most politically aligned individuals with the current government deliberate with less "passion" and more exchanging of knowledge and information. The theoretical framework of this research is institutionalism, which is guided by a more pragmatic view, facing the fluidity of reality in ways showing the multiple relations between agents and their respective institutions. The critical aspirations of this project rest on the works of professors Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Philipp Pettit and in literature from both institutional theory and economic analysis of law, greatly influenced by the Chicago Law School. Methodologically, the paper is a theoretical review and pretends to be unfolded, in a future moment, in empirical tests for verification. This work has as its main analytical tool the appeal to theoretical and doctrinaire areas from the Juridical Sciences, by adopting the deductive and analytical method.

Keywords: institutions, state, law, agencies