How Social Network Structure Affects the Dynamics of Evolution of Cooperation?

Authors: Mohammad Akbarpour, Reza Nasiri Mahalati, Caro Lucas

Abstract:

The existence of many biological systems, especially human societies, is based on cooperative behavior [1, 2]. If natural selection favors selfish individuals, then what mechanism is at work that we see so many cooperative behaviors? One answer is the effect of network structure. On a graph, cooperators can evolve by forming network bunches [2, 3, 4]. In a research, Ohtsuki et al used the idea of iterated prisoners- dilemma on a graph to model an evolutionary game. They showed that the average number of neighbors plays an important role in determining whether cooperation is the ESS of the system or not [3]. In this paper, we are going to study the dynamics of evolution of cooperation in a social network. We show that during evolution, the ratio of cooperators among individuals with fewer neighbors to cooperators among other individuals is greater than unity. The extent to which the fitness function depends on the payoff of the game determines this ratio.

Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Iterated prisoner's dilemma, Model dynamics, Social network structure, Intensity of selection.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1334904

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