Intervention Targeting in Environmental Networks

Authors: Chukwudi Henry Dike

Abstract:

We explore targeted subsidy in a set-up for which manufacturing firms in a waste-spillover network make endogenous production decisions. Here, games of substitution in digraphs arises where waste-producing firms internalise negative externality in a quadratic fashion. We find neutrality in intervention policies that create or reduce spillover links. Most importantly, we observe centrality distinction in asymmetric digraphs so that the dependence and power of each firm play unique roles. Here we see that in targeted subsidy, a firm with greater centrality guarantees optimal welfare improvement. This centrality however measures the weakness of each firm’s Nash-based link to other neighbourhood firms i.e., lower negative externality.

Keywords: Centrality, externality, key-player, Nash-Equilibrium.

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