Search results for: Mattheos K. Protopapas

Authors: Mattheos K. Protopapas, Elias B. Kosmatopoulos

Abstract:

An iterative algorithm is proposed and tested in Cournot Game models, which is based on the convergence of sequential best responses and the utilization of a genetic algorithm for determining each player-s best response to a given strategy profile of its opponents. An extra outer loop is used, to address the problem of finite accuracy, which is inherent in genetic algorithms, since the set of feasible values in such an algorithm is finite. The algorithm is tested in five Cournot models, three of which have convergent best replies sequence, one with divergent sequential best replies and one with “local NE traps"[14], where classical local search algorithms fail to identify the Nash Equilibrium. After a series of simulations, we conclude that the algorithm proposed converges to the Nash Equilibrium, with any level of accuracy needed, in all but the case where the sequential best replies process diverges.

Keywords: Best response, Cournot oligopoly, genetic algorithms, Nash equilibrium.

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