Search results for: takeovers

Authors: Emanuele Peggi

Abstract:

The regulation of competitive takeover bids is one of the most problematic issues of any legislation on takeovers since it concerns a particular type of market, that of corporate control, whose peculiar characteristic is that companies represent "assets" unique of their kind, for each of which there will be a relevant market characterized by the presence of different subjects interested in acquiring control. Firstly, this work aims to analyze, from a comparative point of view, the regulation of takeover bids in competitive scenarios, characterized by the presence of multiple takeover bids for the same target company, and contribute to the debate on the impact that various solutions adopted in some legal systems examined (Italy, UK, and USA) have had on the efficiency of the market for corporate control. Secondly, the different auction models identified by the economic literature and their possible applications to corporate acquisitions in competitive scenarios will be examined, as well as the consequences that the application of each of them causes on the efficiency of the market for corporate control and the interests of the target shareholders. The scope is to study the possibility of attributing to the management of the target company the power to design the auction in order to better protect the interests of shareholders through the adoption of ad hoc models according to the specific context. and in particular on the ground of their assessment of the buyer's risk profile.

Keywords: takeovers, auction theory, shareholders, target company

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Authors: Eda Orhun

Abstract:

Purpose: This paper analyzes a target firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose information during a takeover event and the effect of such disclosures on the outcome of the takeover. Such voluntary disclosures especially in the form of earnings forecasts made around takeover events may affect shareholders’ decisions about the target firm’s value and in return takeover result. This study aims to shed light on this question. Design/methodology/approach: The paper tries to understand the role of voluntary disclosures by target firms during a takeover event in the likelihood of takeover success both theoretically and empirically. A game-theoretical model is set up to analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a target firm to inform the shareholders about its real worth. The empirical implication of model is tested by employing binary outcome models where the disclosure variable is obtained by identifying the target firms in the sample that provide positive news by issuing increasing management earnings forecasts. Findings: The model predicts that a voluntary disclosure of positive information by the target decreases the likelihood that the takeover succeeds. The empirical analysis confirms this prediction by showing that positive earnings forecasts by target firms during takeover events increase the probability of takeover failure. Overall, it is shown that information dissemination through voluntary disclosures by target firms is an important factor affecting takeover outcomes. Originality/Value: This study is the first to the author's knowledge that studies the impact of voluntary disclosures by the target firm during a takeover event on the likelihood of takeover success. The results contribute to information economics, corporate finance and M&As literatures.

Keywords: takeovers, target firm, voluntary disclosures, earnings forecasts, takeover success

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Authors: Astha Sinha, Anjali Kanagali

Abstract:

India has been tackling with less than sophisticated legislations when it comes to recovery of debt and bankruptcy situations for a while now. There were multiple overlapping laws and adjudication forums dealing with financial failures and insolvency of companies/individuals in India without really aiding the timely recover of defaulted assets. It remained dicey for businesses to invest in India since there was a lack of legal and institutional machinery for dealing with debt defaults as per the global standards. After much deliberation, the Indian Draft Insolvency code received the presidential assent on May 28, 2016 bringing the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, 2016 into existence. The Code is expected to bring about great progress for the country and specifically has the two standout developments. The first is that it calls for resolution of corporate insolvency within a period of 180 days extendable by 90 days hence bringing about security in the minds of investors. Second is that it calls for the creation of a new class of insolvency professionals whose primary function shall be helping sick companies and banks with their takeovers, provides for setting up an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board to regulate the same and provides for a two stage process of liquidation. The Code is estimated to help India move up its ranking on the World Bank’s ease of doing business index. It is currently ranked at the 130th position lower than some of the sub-saharan African countries. Besides this, however, there are various areas in which the Code falls short such as lack of provisions for aiding the issue of cross-border insolvency, impact on Medium and Small Enterprises in India etc. This paper aims to analyze the provisions of the new Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code, 2016 and its contribution in making India a more desirable location for doing business. It shall also emphasize on the cross-border insolvency issues, practices followed by other countries to resolve the same and the way forward for India to strengthen its Bankruptcy and Insolvency framework.

Keywords: bankruptcy and insolvency code 2016, cross-border insolvency provisions in the 2016 code, Ease of doing business and bankruptcy code, highlights of the new Indian bankruptcy code 2016

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Authors: T. Elrazaz

Abstract:

This paper examines accrual and real earnings management by publicly listed targets around mergers and acquisitions. Prior literature shows that earnings management around mergers and acquisitions can have a significant economic impact because of the associated wealth transfers among stakeholders. More importantly, acting on behalf of their shareholders or pursuing their self-interests, managers of both targets and acquirers may be equally motivated to manipulate earnings prior to an acquisition to generate higher gains for their shareholders or themselves. Building on the grounds of information asymmetry, agency conflicts, stewardship theory, and the revelation principle, this study addresses the question of whether takeover targets employ accrual and real earnings management in the periods prior to the announcement of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). Additionally, this study examines whether acquirers are able to detect targets’ earnings management, and in response, adjust the acquisition premium paid in order not to face the risk of overpayment. This study uses an aggregate accruals approach in estimating accrual earnings management as proxied by estimated abnormal accruals. Additionally, real earnings management is proxied for by employing widely used models in accounting and finance literature. The results of this study indicate that takeover targets manipulate their earnings using accruals in the second year with an earnings release prior to the announcement of the M&A. Moreover, in partitioning the sample of targets according to the method of payment used in the deal, the results are restricted only to targets of stock-financed deals. These results are consistent with the argument that targets of cash-only or mixed-payment deals do not have the same strong motivations to manage their earnings as their stock-financed deals counterparts do additionally supporting the findings of prior studies that the method of payment in takeovers is value relevant. The findings of this study also indicate that takeover targets manipulate earnings upwards through cutting discretionary expenses the year prior to the acquisition while they do not do so by manipulating sales or production costs. Moreover, in partitioning the sample of targets according to the method of payment used in the deal, the results are restricted only to targets of stock-financed deals, providing further robustness to the results derived under the accrual-based models. Finally, this study finds evidence suggesting that acquirers are fully aware of the accrual-based techniques employed by takeover targets and can unveil such manipulation practices. These results are robust to alternative accrual and real earnings management proxies, as well as controlling for the method of payment in the deal.

Keywords: accrual earnings management, acquisition premium, real earnings management, takeover targets

Procedia PDF Downloads 96