Search results for: moonlighting

Authors: Serguei Cheloukhine

Abstract:

This study examines corrupting and moonlighting enterprise among Russian law enforcement (Police) since the 2009 Police Reform (hereto forward referred to as Reform). This research is based on the survey of about two dozen police officers in Russia’s regions. In addition, we analyzed statistics on crime, policing and socio-economic situation in Russian regions. Congruently, some data on the police officer’s off-duty activities was collected from the Internet sites. These Reforms sought to curb corruption at all levels of the Russian civil service and among uniformed law enforcement (Police) personnel. Many thought that the rebranding of the Militsiya as ‘Politsiya’ (Police) would have a transformational effect, both within the organization as well as how others perceived it. Ultimately, the rebranding effort failed; the only actual changes were the organization’s name and its personnel's uniforms. In fact, the Reforms seems to have contributed to even more corruption and abuse of power, as well an expansion of Law Enforcement’s ties to Corrupt Networks.

Keywords: bribery, corruption, moonlighting, police reform, Russia

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Authors: Xavier Ruiz Del Portal

Abstract:

This paper incorporates mobility between the legal and black economies into a model of tax evasion with endogenous labor supply in which underreporting is possible in one sector but impossible in the other. We have found that the results of the effects along the extensive margin (number of evaders) become more robust and conclusive than those along the intensive margin (hours of illegal work) usually considered by the literature. In particular, it is shown that the following policies reduce the number of evaders: (a) larger and more progressive evasion penalties; (b) higher detection probabilities; (c) an increase in the legal sector wage rate; (d) a decrease in the moonlighting wage rate; (e) higher costs for creating opportunities to evade; (f) lower opportunities to evade, and (g) greater psychological costs of tax evasion. When tax concealment and illegal work also are taken into account, the effects do not vary significantly under the assumptions in Cowell (1985), except for the fact that policies (a) and (b) only hold as regards low- and middle-income groups and policies (e) and (f) as regards high-income groups.

Keywords: income taxation, tax evasion, extensive margin responses, the penalty system

Procedia PDF Downloads 153