Search results for: clawbacks
Commenced in January 2007
Frequency: Monthly
Edition: International
Paper Count: 2

Search results for: clawbacks

2 The Role of Law Corruption and Culture in Investment Fund Manager Fees

Authors: Samir Assal

Abstract:

This paper considers an international sample of venture capital and private equity funds to assess the role of law, corruption and culture in setting fund manager fees in terms of their fixed management fees, carried interest performance fees, clawbacks of fees and cash versus share distributions of fees. The data highlight a role of legal conditions in shaping fees paid to fund managers. In countries with better legal conditions, fixed fees are lower, carried interest fees are higher, clawbacks are less likely, and share distributions are more likely. These findings suggest legal conditions help to align the interests of managers and shareholders. More specifically, we examine which element of legal conditions matter most, and discover that corruption levels play a pronounced role in shaping fund manager fee contracts. We also show that cultural forces such as Hofstede’s measures of power distance and uncertainty avoidance likewise play a role in influencing fees.

Keywords: managerial compensation, incentive contracts, private equity, law and finance

Procedia PDF Downloads 267
1 Time for the United Kingdom to Implement Statutory Clawback Provision on Directors’ Remunerations: Lessons and Experiences from the United States and the Netherlands

Authors: John Kong Shan Ho

Abstract:

Senior executives’ remunerations of public companies have aroused much debate and attention in the media. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), excessive executive pay arrangements were blamed for contributing to excessive risk-taking, which caused the financial meltdown. Since then, regulators and lawmakers around the world have introduced regulations to strengthen the corporate governance of listed companies. A key aspect of such reform is by strengthening regulatory intervention over executives’ remunerations and increasing the transparency of such information. This article is written against such background and examines the recent proposal by the UK BEIS to ask the FRC to amend the UK Corporate Governance Code (UKCGC) to strengthen clawback provisions for directors’ remuneration in listed companies as part of its audit reform. The article examines the background and debates regarding the possible implementation of such a measure in the UK. Contrary to the BEIS’ proposal, it argues that implementing it through the UKCGC is unlikely to enhance overall corporate governance and audit quality. It argues that the UK should follow the footsteps of its US and Dutch counterparts by enacting legislation to claw back directors’ remunerations. It will also provide some recommendations as to the key factors that need to be considered in drafting such a statutory provision.

Keywords: company law, corporate governance, agency problem, directors' remunerations, clawbacks

Procedia PDF Downloads 83