Search results for: Tsvetelina Panchelieva

Authors: Yolanda Zografova, Ekaterina Dimitrova, Tsvetelina Panchelieva, Victoria Nedeva-Atanasova

Abstract:

Aggression and violence amongst school-aged children are widely spread phenomenon, which is expanding both on a global level and in Bulgaria. The purpose of the paper is to reveal the overall range of different types and manifestations of school aggression in a specific age group (12 to 18 years old students) from the 5th to the 12th grade according to the Bulgarian education system. In addition, the research investigates the dynamics of aggressive behaviour in two parallel lines – a horizontal one (with students from the same age) and a vertical one (with students from different grade). In the current study based on the original authors’ inventory (School Aggression Questionnaire), the three main types of aggression are measured – physical, verbal and indirect. The sample consists of 300 students from schools in a big metropolitan city, a mid-sized town, and a small town. Results show that the predominant aggression type is the verbal one, but this is the predominant type for the girls in the sample, not for the boys. Another result is that the higher the school grade, the lower levels of overall aggression is shown by the students. The study of such a multi-dimensional phenomenon as the aggression will provide up-to-date scientific knowledge, important both for the development of science on these topics, and useful for public interests in relation to the balanced development of children and adolescents at school. The results provide an excellent base for the development of prevention and intervention programs in order to reduce school aggression.

Keywords: educational psychology, School aggression, interpersonal relations, school aggression questionnaire, types of aggression

Procedia PDF Downloads 127

Authors: Divyansh Goel, Varun Jain

Abstract:

Classical economics works on the principle that people are rational and analytical in their decision making and their choices fall in line with the most suitable option according to the dominant strategy in a standard game theory model. This model has failed at many occasions in estimating the behavior and dealings of rational people, giving proof of some other underlying heuristics and cognitive biases at work. This paper probes into the study of these factors, which fall under the umbrella of behavioral economics and through their medium explore the solution to a problem which a lot of nations presently face. There has long been a wide disparity in the number of people holding favorable views on organ donation and the actual number of people signing up for the same. This paper, in its entirety, is an attempt to shape the public policy which leads to an increase the number of organ donations that take place and close the gap in the statistics of the people who believe in signing up for organ donation and the ones who actually do. The key assumption here is that in cases of cognitive dissonance, where people have an inconsistency due to conflicting views, people have a tendency to go with the default choice. This tendency is a well-documented cognitive bias known as the status quo bias. The research in this project involves an assay of mandated choice models of organ donation with two case studies. The first of an opt-in system of Germany (where people have to explicitly sign up for organ donation) and the second of an opt-out system of Austria (every citizen at the time of their birth is an organ donor and has to explicitly sign up for refusal). Additionally, there has also been presented a detailed analysis of the experiment performed by Eric J. Johnson and Daniel G. Goldstein. Their research as well as many other independent experiments such as that by Tsvetelina Yordanova of the University of Sofia, both of which yield similar results. The conclusion being that the general population has by and large no rigid stand on organ donation and are gullible to status quo bias, which in turn can determine whether a large majority of people will consent to organ donation or not. Thus, in our paper, we throw light on how governments can use status quo bias to drive positive social change by making policies in which everyone by default is marked an organ donor, which will, in turn, save the lives of people who succumb on organ transplantation waitlists and save the economy countless hours of economic productivity.

Keywords: behavioral economics, game theory, organ donation, status quo bias

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