Search results for: Roy. H. A. Lindelauf

Authors: H. W. Meerveld, R. H. A. Lindelauf

Abstract:

In contemporary warfare, data science is crucial for the military in achieving information superiority. Yet, to the authors’ knowledge, no extensive literature survey on data science in military decision-making has been conducted so far. In this study, 156 peer-reviewed articles were analysed through an integrative, semi-systematic literature review to gain an overview of the topic. The study examined to what extent literature is focussed on the opportunities or risks of data science in military decision-making, differentiated per level of war (i.e. strategic, operational, and tactical level). A relatively large focus on the risks of data science was observed in social science literature, implying that political and military policymakers are disproportionally influenced by a pessimistic view on the application of data science in the military domain. The perceived risks of data science are, however, hardly addressed in formal science literature. This means that the concerns on the military application of data science are not addressed to the audience that can actually develop and enhance data science models and algorithms. Cross-disciplinary research on both the opportunities and risks of military data science can address the observed research gaps. Considering the levels of war, relatively low attention for the operational level compared to the other two levels was observed, suggesting a research gap with reference to military operational data science. Opportunities for military data science mostly arise at the tactical level. On the contrary, studies examining strategic issues mostly emphasise the risks of military data science. Consequently, domain-specific requirements for military strategic data science applications are hardly expressed. Lacking such applications may ultimately lead to a suboptimal strategic decision in today’s warfare.

Keywords: data science, decision-making, information superiority, literature review, military

Procedia PDF Downloads 167

Authors: Roy. H. A. Lindelauf

Abstract:

Cyberattacks are complex processes consisting of multiple interwoven tasks conducted by a set of agents. Interdictions and defenses against such attacks often rely on cyber kill chain (CKC) models. A CKC is a framework that tries to capture the actions taken by a cyber attacker. There exists a growing body of literature on CKCs. Most of this work either a) describes the CKC with respect to one or more specific cyberattacks or b) discusses the tools and technologies used by the attacker at each stage of the CKC. Defenders, facing scarce resources, have to decide where to allocate their resources given the CKC and partial knowledge on the tools and techniques attackers use. In this presentation CKCs are analyzed through the lens of covert projects, i.e., interrelated tasks that have to be conducted by agents (human and/or computer) with the aim of going undetected. Various aspects of covert project models have been studied abundantly in the operations research and game theory domain, think of resource-limited interdiction actions that maximally delay completion times of a weapons project for instance. This presentation has investigated both cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic covert project models and elucidated their relation to CKC modelling. To view a CKC as a covert project each step in the CKC is broken down into tasks and there are players of which each one is capable of executing a subset of the tasks. Additionally, task inter-dependencies are represented by a schedule. Using multi-glove cooperative games it is shown how a defender can optimize the allocation of his scarce resources (what, where and how to monitor) against an attacker scheduling a CKC. This study presents and compares several cooperative game theoretic solution concepts as metrics for assigning resources to the monitoring of agents.

Keywords: cyber defense, cyber kill chain, game theory, information warfare techniques

Procedia PDF Downloads 140