Search results for: Ian Kingsbury

Authors: Ian Kingsbury

Abstract:

The rapid expansion of charter schools (public schools that receive government but do not face the same regulations as traditional public schools) over the preceding two decades has raised concerns over the potential for graft and fraud. These concerns are largely justified: Incidents of financial crime and mismanagement are not unheard of, and the charter sector has become a darling of hedge fund managers. In response, several states have strengthened their charter school regulatory regimes. Imposing regulations and attempting to increase accountability seem like sensible measures, and perhaps they are necessary. However, increased regulation may come at the cost of imposing barriers to entry. Specifically, increased regulation often entails evidence for a high likelihood of fiscal solvency. That should theoretically entail access to capital in the short-term, which may systematically preclude Black or Hispanic applicants from opening charter schools. Moreover, increased regulation necessarily entails more red tape. The institutional wherewithal and the number of hours required to complete an application to open a charter school might favor those who have partnered with an education service provider, specifically a charter management organization (CMO) or education management organization (EMO). These potential barriers to entry pose a significant policy concern. Just as policymakers hope to increase the share of minority teachers and principals, they should sensibly care whether individuals who open charter schools look like the students in that school. Moreover, they might be concerned if successful applications in states with stringent regulations are overwhelmingly affiliated with education service providers. One of the original missions of charter schools was to serve as a laboratory of innovation. Approving only those applications affiliated with education service providers (and in effect establishing a parallel network of schools rather than a diverse marketplace of schools) undermines that mission. Data and methods: The analysis examines more than 2,000 charter school applications from 15 states. It compares the outcomes of applications from states with a strong regulatory environment (those with high scores) from NACSA-the National Association of Charter School Authorizers- to applications from states with a weak regulatory environment (those with a low NACSA score). If the hypothesis is correct, applicants not affiliated with an ESP are more likely to be rejected in high-regulation states compared to those affiliated with an ESP, and minority candidates not affiliated with an education service provider (ESP) are particularly likely to be rejected. Initial returns indicate that the hypothesis holds. More applications in low NASCA-scoring Arizona come from individuals not associated with an ESP, and those individuals are as likely to be accepted as those affiliated with an ESP. On the other hand, applicants in high-NACSA scoring Indiana and Ohio are more than 20 percentage points more likely to be accepted if they are affiliated with an ESP, and the effect is particularly pronounced for minority candidates. These findings should spur policymakers to consider the drawbacks of charter school accountability and consider accountability regimes that do not impose barriers to entry.

Keywords: accountability, barriers to entry, charter schools, choice

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