Search results for: Hezbollah

Authors: Teemu Saressalo

Abstract:

This article examines the evolution of the Israel Defence Forces’ information operation activities during an eight-year timespan from the 2006 war with Hezbollah to more recent operations such as Pillar of Defence and Protective Edge. To this end, the case study will show a change in the Israel Defence Forces’ activities in the information domain. In the 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel inflicted enormous damage on the Lebanese infrastructure, leaving more than 1,200 people dead and 4,400 injured. Casualties among Hezbollah, Israel’s main adversary, were estimated to range from 250 to 700 fighters. Damage to the Lebanese infrastructure was estimated at over USD 2.5bn, with almost 2,000 houses and buildings damaged and destroyed. Even this amount of destruction did not force Hezbollah to yield and while both sides were claiming victory in the war, Israel paid a heavier price in political backlashes and loss of reputation, mainly due to failures in the media and the way in which the war was portrayed and perceived in Israel and abroad. Much of this can be credited to Hezbollah’s efficient use of the media, and Israel’s failure to do so. Israel managed the next conflict it was engaged in completely differently – it had learnt its lessons and built up new ways to counter its adversary’s propaganda and media operations. In Operation Cast Lead at the turn of 2009, Hamas, Israel’s adversary and Gaza’s dominating faction, was not able to utilize the media in the same way that Hezbollah had. By creating a virtual and physical barrier around the Gaza Strip, Israel almost totally denied its adversary access to the worldwide media, and by restricting the movement of journalists in the area, Israel could let its voice be heard above all. The operation Cast Lead began with a deception operation, which caught Hamas totally off guard. The 21-day campaign left the Gaza Strip devastated, but did not cause as much protest in Israel during the operation as the 2006 war did, mainly due to almost total Israeli dominance in the information dimension. The most important outcome from the Israeli perspective was the fact that Operation Cast Lead was assessed to be a success and the operation enjoyed domestic support along with support from many western nations, which had condemned Israeli actions in the 2006 war. Later conflicts have shown the same tendency towards virtually total dominance in the information domain, which has had an impact on target audiences across the world. Thus, it is clear that well-planned and conducted information operations are able to shape public opinion and influence decision-makers, although Israel might have been outpaced by its rivals.

Keywords: Hamas, Hezbollah, information operations, Israel Defence Forces

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Authors: Omair Anas

Abstract:

The Persian Gulf has been in turmoil for a long time since the colonial administration has handed over the role to the small and weak kings and emirs who were assured of protection in return of many economic and security promises to them. The regional order, Saudi Arabia evolved was a rentier regional order secured by an expansion of rentier economy and taking responsibility for much of the expenses of the regional order on behalf of relatively poor countries. The two oil booms helped the Saudi state to expand the 'rentier order' driven stability and bring the countries like Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine under its tutelage. The disruptive misadventure, however, came with Iran's proclamation of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 which it wanted to be exported to its 'un-Islamic and American puppet' Arab neighbours. For Saudi Arabia, even the challenge presented by the socialist-nationalist Arab dictators like Gamal Abdul Nasser and Hafez Al-Assad was not that much threatening to the Saudi Arabia’s then-defensive realism. In the Arab uprisings, the Gulf monarchies saw a wave of insecurity and Iran found it an opportune time to complete the revolutionary process it could not complete after 1979. An alliance of convenience and ideology between Iran and Islamist groups had the real potential to challenge both Saudi Arabia’s own security and its leadership in the region. The disruptive threat appeared at a time when the Saudi state had already sensed an impending crisis originating from the shifts in the energy markets. Low energy prices, declining global demands, and huge investments in alternative energy resources required Saudi Arabia to rationalize its economy according to changing the global political economy. The domestic Saudi reforms remained gradual until the death of King Abdullah in 2015. What is happening now in the region, the Qatar crisis, the Lebanon crisis and the Saudi-Iranian proxy war in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen has combined three immediate objectives, rationalising Saudi economy and most importantly, the resetting the Saudi royal power for Saudi Arabia’s longest-serving future King Mohammad bin Salman. The Saudi King perhaps has no time to wait and watch the power vacuum appearing because of Iran’s expansionist foreign policy. The Saudis appear to be employing an offensive realism by advancing a pro-active regional policy to counter Iran’s threatening influence amid disappearing Western security from the region. As the Syrian civil war is coming to a compromised end with ceding much ground to Iran-controlled militias, Hezbollah and Al-Hashad, the Saudi state has lost much ground in these years and the threat from Iranian proxies is more than a reality, more clearly in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This paper attempts to analyse the changing Saudi behaviour in the region, which, the author understands, is shaped by an offensive-realist approach towards finding a favourable security environment for the Saudi-led regional order, a post-rentier order perhaps.

Keywords: terrorism, Saudi Arabia, Rentier State, gulf crisis

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