A Folk Theorem with Public Randomization Device in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma under Costly Observation

Authors: Yoshifumi Hino

Abstract:

An infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma is a typical model that represents teamwork situation. If both players choose costly actions and contribute to the team, then both players are better off. However, each player has an incentive to choose a selfish action. We analyze the game under costly observation. Each player can observe the action of the opponent only when he pays an observation cost in that period. In reality, teamwork situations are often costly observation. Members of some teams sometimes work in distinct rooms, areas, or countries. In those cases, they have to spend their time and money to see other team members if they want to observe it. The costly observation assumption makes the cooperation difficult substantially because the equilibrium must satisfy the incentives not only on the action but also on the observational decision. Especially, it is the most difficult to cooperate each other when the stage-game is prisoner's dilemma because players have to communicate through only two actions. We examine whether or not players can cooperate each other in prisoner’s dilemma under costly observation. Specifically, we check whether symmetric Pareto efficient payoff vectors in repeated prisoner’s dilemma can be approximated by sequential equilibria or not (efficiency result). We show the efficiency result without any randomization device under certain circumstances. It means that players can cooperate with each other without any randomization device even if the observation is costly. Next, we assume that public randomization device is available, and then we show that any feasible and individual rational payoffs in prisoner’s dilemma can be approximated by sequential equilibria under a specific situation (folk theorem). It implies that players can achieve asymmetric teamwork like leadership situation when public randomization device is available.

Keywords: cost observation, efficiency, folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, private monitoring, repeated games.