Multitasking Incentives and Employee Performance: Evidence from Call Center Field Experiments and Laboratory Experiments

Authors: Sung Ham, Chanho Song, Jiabin Wu

Abstract:

Employees are commonly incentivized on both quantity and quality performance and much of the extant literature focuses on demonstrating that multitasking incentives lead to tradeoffs. Alternatively, we consider potential solutions to the tradeoff problem from both a theoretical and an experimental perspective. Across two field experiments from a call center, we find that tradeoffs can be mitigated when incentives are jointly enhanced across tasks, where previous research has suggested that incentives be reduced instead of enhanced. In addition, we also propose and test, in a laboratory setting, the implications of revising the metric used to assess quality. Our results indicate that metrics can be adjusted to align quality and quantity more efficiently. Thus, this alignment has the potential to thwart the classic tradeoff problem. Finally, we validate our findings with an economic experiment that verifies that effort is largely consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Keywords: incentives, multitasking, field experiment, experimental economics