Contractual Complexity and Contract Parties' Opportunistic Behavior in Construction Projects: In a Contractual Function View

Authors: Mengxia Jin, Yongqiang Chen, Wenqian Wang, Yu Wang

Abstract:

The complexity and specificity of construction projects have made common opportunism phenomenon, and contractual governance for opportunism has been a topic of considerable ongoing research. Based on TCE, the research distinguishes control and coordination as different functions of the contract to investigate their complexity separately. And in a nuanced way, the dimensionality of contractual control is examined. Through the analysis of motivation and capability of strong or weak form opportunism, the framework focuses on the relationship between the complexity of above contractual dimensions and different types of opportunistic behavior and attempts to verify the possible explanatory mechanism. The explanatory power of the research model is evaluated in the light of empirical evidence from questionnaires. We collect data from Chinese companies in the construction industry, and the data collection is still in progress. The findings will speak to the debate surrounding the effects of contract complexity on opportunistic behavior. This nuanced research will derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with inter-organizational opportunism and offer suggestions for curbing contract parties’ opportunistic behavior in construction projects.

Keywords: contractual complexity, contractual control, contractual coordinatio, opportunistic behavior