Generalization of Zhou Fixed Point Theorem

Authors: Yu Lu

Abstract:

Fixed point theory is a basic tool for the study of the existence of Nash equilibria in game theory. This paper presents a significant generalization of the Veinott-Zhou fixed point theorem for increasing correspondences, which serves as an essential framework for investigating the existence of Nash equilibria in supermodular and quasisupermodular games. To establish our proofs, we explore different conceptions of multivalued increasingness and provide comprehensive results concerning the existence of the largest/least fixed point. We provide two distinct approaches to the proof, each offering unique insights and advantages. These advancements not only extend the applicability of the Veinott-Zhou theorem to a broader range of economic scenarios but also enhance the theoretical framework for analyzing equilibrium behavior in complex game-theoretic models. Our findings pave the way for future research in the development of more sophisticated models of economic behavior and strategic interaction.

Keywords: fixed-point, Tarski’s fixed-point theorem, Nash equilibrium, supermodular game