In Defense of Impersonal Obligatoriness

Authors: Peter B. M. Vranas

Abstract:

An important question in moral philosophy is whether whatever is obligatory (i.e., morally required) is personally obligatory, namely obligatory for someone. A positive answer is uncontested in the literature: for example, if it is obligatory for you to keep your promises, it seems that it is obligatory for you you keep your promises. By using conceptual analysis, this paper defends a negative answer: some things are impersonally obligatory, namely obligatory, but not obligatory for anyone. For example, if each of us has promised to vote and thus has an obligation to vote, then it is obligatory that we all vote, but it is not obligatory for anyone that we all vote (because, for example, what is obligatory for you is that you vote, not that we all vote). The paper concludes that there is an important concept of impersonal obligatoriness irreducible to personal obligatoriness.

Keywords: impersonal obligatoriness, ought to be, ought to do, personal obligatoriness