Simons, Ehrlichs and the Case for Polycentricity – Why Growth-Enthusiasts and Growth-Sceptics Must Embrace Polycentricity
Commenced in January 2007
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Edition: International
Paper Count: 84414
Simons, Ehrlichs and the Case for Polycentricity – Why Growth-Enthusiasts and Growth-Sceptics Must Embrace Polycentricity

Authors: Justus Enninga

Abstract:

Enthusiasts and skeptics about economic growth have not much in common in their preference for institutional arrangements that solve ecological conflicts. This paper argues that agreement between both opposing schools can be found in the Bloomington Schools’ concept of polycentricity. Growth-enthusiasts who will be referred to as Simons after the economist Julian Simon and growth-skeptics named Ehrlichs after the ecologist Paul R. Ehrlich both profit from a governance structure where many officials and decision structures are assigned limited and relatively autonomous prerogatives to determine, enforce and alter legal relationships. The paper advances this argument in four steps. First, it will provide clarification of what Simons and Ehrlichs mean when they talk about growth and what the arguments for and against growth-enhancing or degrowth policies are for them and for the other site. Secondly, the paper advances the concept of polycentricity as first introduced by Michael Polanyi and later refined to the study of governance by the Bloomington School of institutional analysis around the Nobel Prize laureate Elinor Ostrom. The Bloomington School defines polycentricity as a non-hierarchical, institutional, and cultural framework that makes possible the coexistence of multiple centers of decision making with different objectives and values, that sets the stage for an evolutionary competition between the complementary ideas and methods of those different decision centers. In the third and fourth parts, it is shown how the concept of polycentricity is of crucial importance for growth-enthusiasts and growth-skeptics alike. The shorter third part demonstrates the literature on growth-enhancing policies and argues that large parts of the literature already accept that polycentric forms of governance like markets, the rule of law and federalism are an important part of economic growth. Part four delves into the more nuanced question of how a stagnant steady-state economy or even an economy that de-grows will still find polycentric governance desirable. While the majority of degrowth proposals follow a top-down approach by requiring direct governmental control, a contrasting bottom-up approach is advanced. A decentralized, polycentric approach is desirable because it allows for the utilization of tacit information dispersed in society and an institutionalized discovery process for new solutions to the problem of ecological collective action – no matter whether you belong to the Simons or Ehrlichs in a green political economy.

Keywords: degrowth, green political theory, polycentricity, institutional robustness

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