The Effects of Cost-Sharing Contracts on the Costs and Operations of E-Commerce Supply Chains

Authors: Sahani Rathnasiri, Pritee Ray, Sardar M. N. Isalm, Carlos A. Vega-Mejia

Abstract:

This study develops a cooperative game theory-based cost-sharing contract model for a business to consumer (B2C) e-commerce supply chain to minimize the overall supply chain costs and the individual costs within an information asymmetry scenario. The objective of this study is to address the issues of strategic interactions among the key players of the e-commerce supply chain operation, which impedes the optimal operational outcomes. Game theory has been included in the field of supply chain management to resolve strategic decision-making issues; however, most of the studies are limited only to two-echelons of the supply chains. Multi-echelon supply chain optimizations based on game-theoretic models are less explored in the previous literature. This study adopts a cooperative game model to focus on the common payoff of operations and addresses the issues of information asymmetry and coordination of a three-echelon e-commerce supply chain. The cost-sharing contract model integrates operational features such as production, inventory management and distribution with the contract related constraints. The outcomes of the model highlight the importance of maintaining lower operational costs by all players to obtain benefits from the cost-sharing contract. Further, the cost-sharing contract ensures true cost revelation, and hence eliminates the information asymmetry issues among the players. Comparing the results of the contract model with the de-centralized e-commerce supply chain operation further emphasizes that the cost-sharing contract derives Pareto-improved outcomes and minimizes the costs of overall e-commerce supply chain operation.

Keywords: cooperative game theory, cost-sharing contract, e-commerce supply chain, information asymmetry