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The Effect of Pyramid Structure on Firm Value

Authors: Irfah Najihah Basir Malan, Norhana Salamudin, Noryati Ahmad

Abstract:

Corporate ownership structure is an important factor influencing firm performance. This study aims to answer the question whether pyramid structure has negative effect on firm value. This study is important because the ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia is highly concentrated. The concentrated ownership such as Malaysia, agency conflict is prevalent between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Accordingly, the dominant role of shareholders in firms allows the controlling shareholders (including managers) to expropriate the interest of the minority shareholders for their own private advantage. This research is conducted on pyramidal firms in Malaysia. Applying the Attig Model as the underlying statistical test, it is found that firm value is negatively related to pyramid ownership of Malaysian public listed firms due to the mismatch between cash flow rights and control rights. Future research needs to focus on identifying the heterogeneous factors that improve the generalizability of research.

Keywords: Pyramid structure, Cash flow right, Control right, Firm value, Attig model.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1336254

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