Burden Sharing in Combating Terrorist Financing

Authors: M. Bogers, R. Beeres

Abstract:

This paper contributes to the literature concerning burden sharing. We provide a quantitative expression of the burden sharing behaviour of 174 states in the case of combating terrorist financing and address specific burden sharing issues in this context (i.e., weakest link; no substitutability). We conclude that advanced states have shown more effort to control terrorist financing than developing states. In this particular case, there is an incentive for advanced states to support developing states. Failing to do so will make the total financial system worse off.

Keywords: Burden sharing, combating terrorist financing, weakest link.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1089090

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