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Are Economic Crises and Government Changes Related? A Descriptive Statistic Analysis

Authors: Şakir Görmüş, Ali Kabasakal


The main purpose of this study is to provide a detailed statistical overview of the time and regional distribution, relative timing occurrence of economic crises and government changes in 51 economies over the 1990–2007 periods. At the same time, the predictive power of the economic crises on set government changes will be examined using “signal approach". The result showed that the percentage of government changes is highest in transition economies (86 percent of observations) and lowest in Latin American economies (39 percent of observations). The percentages of government changes are same in both developed and developing countries (43 percent of observations). However, average crises per year (frequency of crises) are higher (lower) in developing (developed) countries than developed (developing) countries. Also, the predictive power of economic crises about the onset of a government change is highest in Transition economies (81 percent) and lowest in Latin American countries (30 percent). The predictive power of economic crises in developing countries (43 percent) is lower than developed countries (55 percent).

Keywords: Economic crises, Government Changes, PoliticalEconomy, Signal Approach.

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