Vulnerabilities of IEEE 802.11i Wireless LAN CCMP Protocol

Authors: M. Junaid , Muid Mufti, M. Umar Ilyas

Abstract:

IEEE has recently incorporated CCMP protocol to provide robust security to IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs. It is found that CCMP has been designed with a weak nonce construction and transmission mechanism, which leads to the exposure of initial counter value. This weak construction of nonce renders the protocol vulnerable to attacks by intruders. This paper presents how the initial counter can be pre-computed by the intruder. This vulnerability of counter block value leads to pre-computation attack on the counter mode encryption of CCMP. The failure of the counter mode will result in the collapse of the whole security mechanism of 802.11 WLAN.

Keywords: Information Security, Cryptography, IEEE 802.11i, Computer security, Wireless LAN

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1333294

References:

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