Equal Sharing Solutions for Bicooperative Games

Authors: Fan-Yong Meng, Yan Wang

Abstract:

In this paper, we discuss the egalitarianism solution (ES) and center-of-gravity of the imputation-set value (CIV) for bicooperative games, which can be seen as the extensions of the solutions for traditional games given by Dutta and Ray [1] and Driessen and Funaki [2]. Furthermore, axiomatic systems for the given values are proposed. Finally, a numerical example is offered to illustrate the player ES and CTV.

Keywords: Bicooperative games, egalitarianism solution, center of- gravity of the imputation-set value.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1331619

References:

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