Corporate Governance Networks and Interlocking Directorates in the Czech Republic

Authors: Ondřej Nowak

Abstract:

This paper presents an exploration into the structure of the corporate governance network and interlocking directorates in the Czech Republic. First a literature overview and a basic terminology of the network theory is presented. Further in the text, statistics and other calculations relevant to corporate governance networks are presented. For this purpose an empirical data set consisting of 2 906 joint stock companies in the Czech Republic was examined. Industries with the highest average number of interlocks per company were healthcare, and energy and utilities. There is no observable link between the financial performance of the company and the number of its interlocks. Also interlocks with financial companies are very rare.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Interlocking Directorates, Network Theory, Czech Republic.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1058767

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