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New Mitigating Technique to Overcome DDOS Attack

Authors: V. Praveena, N. Kiruthika

Abstract:

In this paper, we explore a new scheme for filtering spoofed packets (DDOS attack) which is a combination of path fingerprint and client puzzle concepts. In this each IP packet has a unique fingerprint is embedded that represents, the route a packet has traversed. The server maintains a mapping table which contains the client IP address and its corresponding fingerprint. In ingress router, client puzzle is placed. For each request, the puzzle issuer provides a puzzle which the source has to solve. Our design has the following advantages over prior approaches, 1) Reduce the network traffic, as we place a client puzzle at the ingress router. 2) Mapping table at the server is lightweight and moderate.

Keywords: Client puzzle, DDOS attack, Egress, Ingress, IP Spoofing, Spoofed Packet.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1056012

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