Relationships between Information Transparency, Corporate Governance and D&O Insurance

Authors: Shu-Lin Lin, Ching-Chien Yang

Abstract:

This study examines the influence of information transparency and corporate governance on purchase directors and officers liability (D&O) insurance decisions. The results show that companies with greater information transparency have significant demand for D&O insurance. Greater transparency in voluntary disclosures is significantly and positively associated with demand for insurance, indicating that increasing the degree of information disclosure reduces information asymmetry for insurers, which stimulates their willingness to provide greater protection. Analysis of insured and uninsured subsamples indicates that uninsured companies have superior corporate governance compared to insured companies. Although insured companies tend to have weaker corporate governance structures, they appoint Big 4 firms or industry experts to compensate for the weakness of their corporate governance. Empirical results indicate that purchasing D&O insurance can strengthen external corporate governance and increase companies’ willingness to voluntarily provide more transparent information.

Keywords: Directors and officers liability (D&O) insurance, information transparency, corporate governance, Big 4.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1087542

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