How Do Politicians Recover Their Costs? The Political Economy of Representative Democracy in India

Authors: Subramaniam Chandran

Abstract:

This paper explores the features of political economy in the dynamics of representative politics in India. Politics is seen as enhancing economic benefits through acquiring and maintenance of power in the realm of democratic set up. The system of representation is riddled with competitive populism. Emerging leaders and parties are forced to accommodate their ideologies in coping with competitive politics. Electoral politics and voting behaviour reflect series of influences mooted by the politicians. Voters are accustomed to expect benefits outs of state exchequer. The electoral competitors show a changing phase of investment and return policy. Every elector has to spend and realize his costs in his tenure. In the case of defeated electors, even the cost recovery is not possible directly; there are indirect means to recover their costs. The series of case studies show the method of party funding, campaign financing, electoral expenditure, and cost recovery. Regulations could not restrict the level of spending. Several cases of disproportionate accumulation of wealth by the politicians reveal that money played a major part in electoral process. The political economy of representative politics hitherto ignores how a politician spends and recovers his cost and multiples his wealth. To be sure, the acquiring and maintenance of power is to enhance the wealth of the electors.

Keywords: Political economy, representative politics, costrecovery, electoral politics

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1334892

References:

[1] Alan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government, London: Macmillan, 1978; Jean Blondel, Political Parties: A Genuine Case for Discontent, London: Wildwood House, 1978.
[2] S. Chandran, Indhya Arasiyal, Bharathi Puthakalayam, Chennai, 2003; V.B. Sing and S.Bose eds. Elections in India: Data Handbook on Lok Sabha Elections, 1952-80, New Delhi: Sage, 1984; J.C. Johari, Indian Government and Politics, Jalandhar, Vishal, 1988; Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari, Indian Voting Behaviour: Studies of the 1962 General Elections, Calcutta: Firma K Mukhopadhyayay, 1965.
[3] Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper, 1957; Stephen Ansolabehere, "The Scope of Corruption: Lessons from Comparative Campaign Finance Disclosure," Election Law Journal, 6: 2, 2007; D. Tripathi, ed. Business and Politics in India: A Historical Perspective, Delhi: Manohar, 1991.
[4] David Butler, Ashok Lahiri and Prannoy Roy, India Decides: Elections 1952-1995, Delhi: Books and Things, 1995.
[5] Report of the Election Commission of India, New Delhi, 2011.
[6] S.K. Mitra and J. Chiriyankandath, eds. Electoral Politics in India: A Changing Landscape, New Delhi: Segment Books, 1992.
[7] Norio Kondo, "Election Studies in India," Discussion Paper No. 98, Institute Of Developing Economies, Jetro, Chiba, March 2007.
[8] S. Chandran, Tamizhaga Arasiyal, Chennai: Bharathi Puthakalayam, 2001