U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making in the Area of Religion, 1987-2011

Authors: Joseph Ignagni, Rebecca E. Deen

Abstract:

There are many views on how human decision makers behave. In this work, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court will be viewed in terms of constrained maximization and cognitivecybernetic theory. This paper will integrate research in such fields as law, political science, psychology, economics and decision making theory. It will be argued that due to its heavy workload, the Supreme Court is forced to make decisions in a boundedly rational manner. The ideas and theory put forward here will be tested in the area of the Court’s decisions involving religion. Therefore, the cases involving the U.S. Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause will be analyzed. Also, variables such as the U.S. government’s involvement in these cases will be considered. The years to be studied will be 1987-2011.

Keywords: Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, U.S. Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1075046

References:

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