Commenced in January 2007
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Paper Count: 30184
Authentication Analysis of the 802.11i Protocol

Authors: Zeeshan Furqan, Shahabuddin Muhammad, Ratan Guha

Abstract:

IEEE has designed 802.11i protocol to address the security issues in wireless local area networks. Formal analysis is important to ensure that the protocols work properly without having to resort to tedious testing and debugging which can only show the presence of errors, never their absence. In this paper, we present the formal verification of an abstract protocol model of 802.11i. We translate the 802.11i protocol into the Strand Space Model and then prove the authentication property of the resulting model using the Strand Space formalism. The intruder in our model is imbued with powerful capabilities and repercussions to possible attacks are evaluated. Our analysis proves that the authentication of 802.11i is not compromised in the presented model. We further demonstrate how changes in our model will yield a successful man-in-the-middle attack.

Keywords: authentication, formal analysis, formal verification, security.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1074529

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