Epistemological Functions of Emotions and Their Relevance to the Formation of Citizens and Scientists

Authors: Dení Stincer Gómez, Zuraya Monroy Nasr

Abstract:

Pedagogy of science historically has given priority to teaching strategies that mobilize the cognitive mechanisms leaving out emotional mechanisms. Modern epistemology, cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis begin to argue and prove that emotions are relevant epistemological functions. They are 1) the selection function: that allows the perception and reason choose, to multiple alternative explanation of a particular fact, those are relevant and discard those that are not, 2) heuristic function: that is related to the activation cognitive processes that are effective in the process of knowing; and 3) the so-called content-bearing function: it argues that emotions provide the material reasoning that is subsequently transformed into linguistic propositions. According to these hypotheses, scientific knowledge seems to come from emotions that meet these functions. This paper argues that science education must start from the presence of certain emotions in the learner if we want to form citizens with a scientific or cultural future.

Keywords: Epistemic emotions, science education, formation of citizens and scientists, epistemic functions of emotions.

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