The Theory and Practice of the State Model of Corporate Governance
Commenced in January 2007
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The Theory and Practice of the State Model of Corporate Governance

Authors: Asaiel Alohaly

Abstract:

A theoretical framework for corporate governance is needed to bridge the gap between the corporate governance of private companies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The two dominant models, being shareholder and stakeholder, do not always address the specific requirements and challenges posed by ‘hybrid’ companies; namely, previously national bodies that have been privatised while the government retains significant control or holds a majority of shares. Thus, an exploratory theoretical study is needed to identify how ‘hybrid’ companies should be defined and why the state model should be acknowledged since it is the less conspicuous model in comparison with the shareholder and stakeholder models. This research focuses on the state model of corporate governance to understand the complex ownership, control pattern, goals, and corporate governance of these hybrid companies. The significance of this research lies in the fact that there is a limited available publication on the state model. This research argues for the state model, which proceeds from an understanding of the institutionally embedded characteristics of hybrid companies, where the government as a shareholder, is either a majority of the total shares, or has been granted power based on the rule of law; the company bylaws.

Keywords: Corporate governance, control, shareholders, state model.

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