Macro Corruption: A Conceptual Analysis of Its Dimensions and Forward and Backward Linkages

Authors: Ahmed Sakr Ashour, Hoda Saad AboRemila

Abstract:

An attempt was made to fill the gap in the macro analysis of corruption by suggesting a conceptual framework that differentiates four types of macro corruption: state capture, political, bureaucratic and financial/corporate. The economic consequences or forward linkages (growth, inclusiveness and sustainability of development) and macro institutional determinants constituting the backward linkages of each type were delineated. The research implications of the macro perspective and proposed framework were discussed. Implications of the findings for theory, research and reform policies addressing macro corruption issues were discussed.

Keywords: Economic growth, Inclusive growth, macro corruption, sustainable development.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2021841

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