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Improved Safety Science: Utilizing a Design Hierarchy

Authors: Ulrica Pettersson


Collection of information on incidents is regularly done through pre-printed incident report forms. These tend to be incomplete and frequently lack essential information. ne consequence is that reports with inadequate information, that do not fulfil analysts’ requirements, are transferred into the analysis process. To improve an incident reporting form, theory in design science, witness psychology and interview and questionnaire research has been used. Previously three experiments have been conducted to evaluate the form and shown significant improved results. The form has proved to capture knowledge, regardless of the incidents’ character or context. The aim in this paper is to describe how design science, in more detail a design hierarchy can be used to construct a collection form for improvements in safety science.

Keywords: Design science, data collection, form, incident report, safety science.

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