Human Security Providers in Fragile State under Asymmetric War Conditions

Authors: Luna Shamieh

Abstract:

Various players are part of the game in an asymmetric war, all making efforts to provide human security to their own adherents. Although a fragile state is not able to provide sufficient and comprehensive services, it still provides special services and security to the elite; the insurgents as well provide services and security to their associates. The humanitarian organisations, on the other hand, provide some fundamental elements of human security, but only in the regions, they are able to access when possible (if possible). The counterinsurgents (security forces of the state and intervention forces) operate within a narrow band defined by the vision of the responsibility to protect and the perspective of the resolution of the conflict through combat; hence, the possibility to provide human security is shaken at this end. This article examines how each player provides human security from the perspective of freedom from want in order to secure basic and strategic needs, freedom from fear through providing protection against all kinds of violence, and the freedom to live in dignity. It identifies a vicious cycle caused by the intervention of the different players causing a centrifugal force that may lead to disintegration of the nation under war.

Keywords: Human security, asymmetric war, counter insurgency, fragile state, insurgency.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1124698

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