Playing Games with Genetic Algorithms: Application on Price-QoS Competition in Telecommunications Market

Authors: M’hamed Outanoute, Mohamed Baslam, Belaid Bouikhalene

Abstract:

The customers use the best compromise criterion between price and quality of service (QoS) to select or change their Service Provider (SP). The SPs share the same market and are competing to attract more customers to gain more profit. Due to the divergence of SPs interests, we believe that this situation is a non-cooperative game of price and QoS. The game converges to an equilibrium position known Nash Equilibrium (NE). In this work, we formulate a game theoretic framework for the dynamical behaviors of SPs. We use Genetic Algorithms (GAs) to find the price and QoS strategies that maximize the profit for each SP and illustrate the corresponding strategy in NE. In order to quantify how this NE point is performant, we perform a detailed analysis of the price of anarchy induced by the NE solution. Finally, we provide an extensive numerical study to point out the importance of considering price and QoS as a joint decision parameter.

Keywords: Pricing, QoS, Market share game, Genetic algorithms, Nash equilibrium, Learning, Price of anarchy.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1110111

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