Search results for: allegiance

Authors: B. Gangloff, L. Mayoral, A. Rezrazi

Abstract:

Three types of salary distribution are usually proposed by the theorists of distributive justice: Equality, equity and need. Their influence has been studied, taking into consideration (in terms of equity) the performance of the employees and their degree of allegiance/rebellion in what regards discriminatory hierarchical orders, by taking into account the reasons of such allegiance/rebellion (allegiance out of conviction, legalism or opportunism/ethical rebellion). Conducted in Argentina, the study has confronted 480 students (240 male and 240 female) with a practical case in which they had to advise a manager of a real estate agency on the allocation of a bonus amongst his employees. The latter were characterized according to their respective performance, one of them being further defined as being (or not) in a financial need and as having complied (or not) with a discriminatory hierarchical order regarding foreigners. The results show that the distribution of the bonus only follows the rules of equity and need: The employees more efficient, allegiant or in need, are rewarded more than the others. It is also noteworthy that the allegiant employees are rewarded in the same way, regardless of the reason for their allegiance, and that the employee who refuses to adopt a discriminatory conduct is penalized.

Keywords: Distributive justice, equity, performance, allegiance, ethic.

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Authors: Diya Sarkar, Prafulla C. Mishra

Abstract:

In a parliamentary system, party discipline is the impulse; when it falls short, the government usually falls. Conceivably, the platform of Indian politics suffers with innumerous practical disorders. The politics of defection is one such specie entailing gross miscarriage of fair conduct turning politics into a game of thrones (powers). This practice of political nomaditude can trace its seed in the womb of British House of Commons. Therein, if a legislator was found to cross the floor, the party considered him disloyal. In other words, the legislator lost his allegiance to his former party by joining another party. This very phenomenon, in practice has a two way traffic i.e. ruling party to the opposition party or vice versa. The democracies like USA, Australia and Canada were also aware of this fashion of swapping loyalties. There have been several instances of great politicians changing party allegiance, for example Winston Churchill, Ramsay McDonald, William Gladstone etc. Nevertheless, it is interesting to cite that irrespective of such practice of changing party allegiance, none of the democracies in the west ever desired or felt the need to legislatively ban defections. But, exceptionally India can be traced to have passed anti-defection laws. The politics of defection had been a unique popular phenomenon on the floor of Indian Parliamentary system gradually gulping the democratic essence and synchronization of the Federation. This study is both analytical and doctrinal, which tries to examine whether representative democracy has lost its essence due to political nomadism. The present study also analyzes the classical as well as contemporary pulse of floor crossing amidst dynastic politics in a representative democracy. It will briefly discuss the panorama of defections under the Indian federal structure in the light of the anti-defection law and an attempt has been made to add valuable suggestions to streamline remedy for the still prevalent political defections.

Keywords: Constitutional law, defection, democracy, political anti-trust.

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Authors: Wanda Luen-Wun Siu, Xiaowen Zhang

Abstract:

This paper offered the primary methodical proof on how director remuneration related to enterprise earnings in listed firms in China in light of most evidence focusing on cross-sectional data or data in a short span of time. Using full economic and business panel data on China’s publicly listed enterprise from 1999 to 2020 over two decades in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research database, we found statistically significant positive associations between director pay and firm performance in privately owned firms over this period, supporting the agency theory. In contrast, among the state-owned enterprises, there was a reverse relation between director compensation and firm financial performance, contributing to the existing literature. But the results also revealed that state-owned enterprises financially performed as well as private enterprises. Such findings suggested that state ownership might line up officials’ career incentives with party prime concern rather than pecuniary incentives. Also, CEO duality enhanced firm performance. As such, allegiance to the party and possible advancement to an upper-level political position would motivate company directors in state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, directors in privately owned enterprises might be motivated by monetary incentives. In addition, a statistical regression model was proposed and tested to get the results of the performance of state-owned enterprises. Finally, some suggestions were made about how to improve the institutional management of government-owned corporations in China.

Keywords: China’s listed Firm, director compensation, CEO duality, firm performance, panel analysis.

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