Search results for: hospitality tier

Authors: Luc Beal

Abstract:

Introduction. Among the stakeholders involved in the tourist decision-making process, the accommodation provider has the potential to play a crucial role in raising awareness, disseminating information, and thus influencing the tourists’ choice of transportation. Since the early days of tourism, the accommodation provider has consistently served as the primary point of contact with the destination, and consequently, as the primary source of information for visitors. By offering accommodation and hospitality, the accommodation provider has evolved into a trusted third party, functioning as an 'ambassador' capable of recommending the finest attractions and activities available at the destination. In contemporary times, when tourists plan their trips, they make a series of consecutive decisions, with the most important decision being to lock-in the accommodation reservation for the earliest days, so as to secure a safe arrival. Consequently, tourists place their trust in the accommodation provider not only for lodging but also for recommendations regarding restaurants, activities, and more. Thus, the latter has the opportunity to inform and influence tourists well in advance of their arrival, particularly during the booking phase, namely when it comes to selecting their mode of transportation. The pressing need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the tourism sector presents an opportunity to underscore the influence that accommodation providers have historically exerted on tourist decision-making . Methodology A participatory research, currently ongoing in south-western France, in collaboration with a nationwide hotel group and several destination management organizations, aims at examining the factors that determine the ability of accommodation providers to influence tourist transportation choices. Additionally, the research seeks to identify the conditions that motivate accommodation providers to assume a proactive role, such as fostering customer loyalty, reduced distribution costs, and financial compensation mechanisms. A panel of hotels participated in a series of focus group sessions with tourists, with the objective of modeling the decision-making process of tourists regarding their choice of transportation mode and to identify and quantify the types and levels of incentives liable to encourage environmentally responsible choices. Individual interviews were also conducted with hotel staff, including receptionists and guest relations officers, to develop a framework for interactions with tourists during crucial decision-making moments related to transportation choices. The primary finding of this research indicates that financial incentives significantly outweigh symbolic incentives in motivating tourists to opt for eco-friendly modes of transportation. Another noteworthy result underscores the crucial impact of organizational conditions governing interactions with tourists both before and during their stay. These conditions greatly influence the ability to raise awareness at key decision-making moments and the possibility of gathering data about the chosen transportation mode during the stay. In conclusion, this research has led to the formulation of practical recommendations for accommodation providers and Destination Marketing Organizations (DMOs). These recommendations pertain to communication protocols with tourists, the collection of evidences confirming chosen transportation modes, and the implementation of necessary incentives. Through these measures, accommodation provider can assume a central role in guiding tourists towards making responsible choices in terms of transportation.

Keywords: accommodation provider, trusted third party, environmentally-friendly transportation, green house gas, tourist decision-making process

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Authors: Ririh Rahma Ratinghayu, Jayu Pramudya, Nur Aini Masruroh, Shi-Woei Lin

Abstract:

This research studies pricing strategy in cooperative setting of hotel duopoly selling perishable product under fixed capacity constraint by using the perspective of managers. In hotel revenue management, competitor’s average room rate and occupancy rate should be taken into manager’s consideration in determining pricing strategy to generate optimum revenue. This information is not provided by business intelligence or available in competitor’s website. Thus, Information Sharing (IS) among players might result in improved performance of pricing strategy. IS is widely adopted in the logistics industry, but IS within hospitality industry has not been well-studied. This research put IS as one of cooperative game schemes, besides Mutual Price Setting (MPS) scheme. In off-peak season, hotel manager arranges pricing strategy to offer promotion package and various kinds of discounts up to 60% of full-price to attract customers. Competitor selling homogenous product will react the same, then triggers a price war. Price war which generates lower revenue may be avoided by creating collaboration in pricing strategy to optimize payoff for both players. In MPS cooperative game, players collaborate to set a room rate applied for both players. Cooperative game may avoid unfavorable players’ payoff caused by price war. Researches on horizontal cooperative game in logistics show better performance and payoff for the players, however, horizontal cooperative game in hotel revenue management has not been demonstrated. This paper aims to develop hotel revenue management models under duopoly cooperative schemes (IS & MPS), which are compared to models under non-cooperative scheme too. Each scheme has five models, Capacity Allocation Model; Demand Model; Revenue Model; Optimal Price Model; and Equilibrium Price Model. Capacity Allocation Model and Demand Model employs self-hotel and competitor’s full and discount price as predictors under non-linear relation. Optimal price is obtained by assuming revenue maximization motive. Equilibrium price is observed by interacting self-hotel’s and competitor’s optimal price under reaction equation. Equilibrium is analyzed using game theory approach. The sequence applies for three schemes. MPS Scheme differently aims to optimize total players’ payoff. The case study in which theoretical models are applied observes two hotels offering homogenous product in Indonesia during a year. The Capacity Allocation, Demand, and Revenue Models are built using multiple regression and statistically tested for validation. Case study data confirms that price behaves within demand model in a non-linear manner. IS Models can represent the actual demand and revenue data better than Non-IS Models. Furthermore, IS enables hotels to earn significantly higher revenue. Thus, duopoly hotel players in general, might have reasonable incentives to share information horizontally. During off-peak season, MPS Models are able to predict the optimal equal price for both hotels. However, Nash equilibrium may not always exist depending on actual payoff of adhering or betraying mutual agreement. To optimize performance, horizontal cooperative game may be chosen over non-cooperative game. Mathematical models can be used to detect collusion among business players. Empirical testing can be used as policy input for market regulator in preventing unethical business practices potentially harming society welfare.

Keywords: horizontal cooperative game theory, hotel revenue management, information sharing, mutual price setting

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