Search results for: Ting-Yu Lin

Authors: Kang Zijian, Zhang Tingyu, Burra Venkata Durga Kumar

Abstract:

This article investigates the challenges in memory migration during the live migration of virtual machines. We found three challenges probably existing in pre-copy technology. One of the main challenges is the challenge of downtime migration. Decrease the downtime could promise the normal work for a virtual machine. Although pre-copy technology is greatly decreasing the downtime, we still need to shut down the machine in order to finish the last round of data transfer. This paper provides an optimization scheme for the problems existing in pro-copy technology, mainly the optimization of the dirty page migration mechanism. The typical pre-copy technology copy n-1th’s dirty pages in nth turn. However, our idea is to create a double iteration method to solve this problem.

Keywords: virtual machine, pre-copy technology, memory migration process, downtime, dirty pages migration method

Procedia PDF Downloads 85

Authors: Tingyu Zhang

Abstract:

This paper utilizes the Super-SBM model to assess water resources green efficiency (WRGE) among provinces in China and investigate its spatial and temporal features, based on the characteristic framework of “economy-environment-society.” The social network analysis is employed to examine the network pattern and spatial interaction of WRGE. Further, the quadratic assignment procedure method is utilized for examining the influencing factors of the spatial association of WRGE regarding “relationship.” The study reveals that: (1) the spatial distribution of WRGE demonstrates a distribution pattern of Eastern>Western>Central; (2) a remarkable spatial association exists among provinces; however, no strict hierarchical structure is observed. The internal structure of the WRGE network is characterized by the feature of "Eastern strong and Western weak". The block model analysis discovers that the members of the “net spillover” and “two-way spillover” blocks are mostly in the eastern and central provinces; “broker” block, which plays an intermediary role, is mostly in the central provinces; and members of the “net beneficiary” block are mostly in the western region. (3) Differences in economic development, degree of urbanization, water use environment, and water management have significant impacts on the spatial connection of WRGE. This study is dedicated to the realization of regional linkages and synergistic enhancement of WRGE, which provides a meaningful basis for building a harmonious society of human and water coexistence.

Keywords: water resources green efficiency, super-SBM model, social network analysis, quadratic assignment procedure

Procedia PDF Downloads 16

Authors: Tingyu Zhang

Abstract:

The cross-basin ecological compensation mechanism is key to stimulating active participation in ecological protection across the entire basin. This study constructs an evolutionary game model of cross-basin ecological compensation in the Yangtze River Economic Belt (YREB), introducing a central government constraint and incentive mechanism (CGCIM) to explore the conditions for achieving strategies of protection and compensation that meet societal expectations. Furthermore, using a water quality-water quantity model combined with factual data from the YREB in 2020, the amount of ecological compensation is calculated. The results indicate that the stability of the evolutionary game model of the upstream and downstream governments in the YREB is closely related to the CGCIM. When the sum of the central government's reward amount to the upstream government and the penalty amount to both sides simultaneously is greater than 39.948 billion yuan, and the sum of the reward amount to the downstream government and the penalty amount to only the lower reaches is greater than 1.567 billion yuan, or when the sum of the reward amount to the downstream government and the penalty amount to both sides simultaneously is greater than 1.567 billion yuan, and the sum of the reward amount to the upstream government and the penalty amount to only the upstream government is greater than 399.48 billion yuan, the protection and compensation become the only evolutionarily stable strategy for the evolutionary game system composed of the upstream and downstream governments in the YREB. At this point, the total ecological compensation that the downstream government of the YREB should pay to the upstream government is 1.567 billion yuan, with Hunan paying 0.03 billion yuan, Hubei 2.53 billion yuan, Jiangxi 0.18 billion yuan, Anhui 1.68 billion yuan, Zhejiang 0.75 billion yuan, Jiangsu 6.57 billion yuan, and Shanghai 3.93 billion yuan. The research results can provide a reference for promoting the improvement and perfection of the cross-basin ecological compensation system in the YREB.

Keywords: ecological compensation, evolutionary game model, central government constraint and incentive mechanism, Yangtze river economic belt

Procedia PDF Downloads 18