Search results for: Rahma Abed

Authors: Yifat Koren Carmi, Abed Agbarya, Hazem Khamaisi, Raymond Farah, Yelena Shechtman, Roman Korobochka, Jacob Gopas, Jamal Mahajna

Abstract:

Ovarian cancer (OC), the second most common form of gynecological malignancy, has a poor prognosis and is frequently identified in its late stages. The recommended treatment for OC typically includes a platinum-based chemotherapy, like carboplatin. Nonetheless, OC treatment has proven challenging due to toxicity and development of acquired resistance to therapy. Chemoresistance is a significant obstacle to a long-lasting response in OC patients, believed to arise from alterations within the cancer cells as well as within the tumor microenvironments (TME). Malignant ascites is a presenting feature in more than one-third of OC patients. It serves as a reservoir for a complex mixture of soluble factors, metabolites, and cellular components, providing a pro-inflammatory and tumor-promoting microenvironment for the OC cells. Malignant ascites is also associated with metastasis and chemoresistance. In an attempt to elucidate the role of TME in chemoresistance of OC, we monitored the ability of soluble factors derived from ascites fluids to affect platinum sensitivity of OC cells. This research, compared ascites fluids from non-malignant cirrhotic patients to those from OC patients in terms of their ability to alter the platinum sensitivity of OC cells. Our findings indicated that exposure to OC ascites induces platinum chemoresistance on OC cells in 11 out of 13 cases (85%). In contrast, 75% of cirrhosis ascites (3 out of 4) failed to confer platinum chemoresistance to OC cells. Cytokine array analysis revealed that IL-6, and to a lesser extent HGF were enriched in OC ascites, whereas IL-22 was enriched in cirrhosis ascites. Pharmaceutical inhibitors that target the IL-6/JAK signaling pathway were mildly effective in overcoming the platinum chemoresistance induced by malignant ascites. In contrast, Crizotinib an HGF/c-MET inhibitor, and 2-hydroxyestradiol (2HE2) were effective in restoring platinum chemoresistance to OC. Our findings demonstrate the importance of OC ascites in supporting platinum chemoresistance as well as the potential of a combination therapy with Crizotinib and the estradiol metabolite 2HE2 to regain OC cells chemosensitivity.

Keywords: ovarian cancer, platinum chemoresistance, malignant ascites, tumor microenvironment, IL-6, 2-hydroxyestradiol, HGF, crizotinib

Procedia PDF Downloads 33

Authors: Ririh Rahma Ratinghayu, Jayu Pramudya, Nur Aini Masruroh, Shi-Woei Lin

Abstract:

This research studies pricing strategy in cooperative setting of hotel duopoly selling perishable product under fixed capacity constraint by using the perspective of managers. In hotel revenue management, competitor’s average room rate and occupancy rate should be taken into manager’s consideration in determining pricing strategy to generate optimum revenue. This information is not provided by business intelligence or available in competitor’s website. Thus, Information Sharing (IS) among players might result in improved performance of pricing strategy. IS is widely adopted in the logistics industry, but IS within hospitality industry has not been well-studied. This research put IS as one of cooperative game schemes, besides Mutual Price Setting (MPS) scheme. In off-peak season, hotel manager arranges pricing strategy to offer promotion package and various kinds of discounts up to 60% of full-price to attract customers. Competitor selling homogenous product will react the same, then triggers a price war. Price war which generates lower revenue may be avoided by creating collaboration in pricing strategy to optimize payoff for both players. In MPS cooperative game, players collaborate to set a room rate applied for both players. Cooperative game may avoid unfavorable players’ payoff caused by price war. Researches on horizontal cooperative game in logistics show better performance and payoff for the players, however, horizontal cooperative game in hotel revenue management has not been demonstrated. This paper aims to develop hotel revenue management models under duopoly cooperative schemes (IS & MPS), which are compared to models under non-cooperative scheme too. Each scheme has five models, Capacity Allocation Model; Demand Model; Revenue Model; Optimal Price Model; and Equilibrium Price Model. Capacity Allocation Model and Demand Model employs self-hotel and competitor’s full and discount price as predictors under non-linear relation. Optimal price is obtained by assuming revenue maximization motive. Equilibrium price is observed by interacting self-hotel’s and competitor’s optimal price under reaction equation. Equilibrium is analyzed using game theory approach. The sequence applies for three schemes. MPS Scheme differently aims to optimize total players’ payoff. The case study in which theoretical models are applied observes two hotels offering homogenous product in Indonesia during a year. The Capacity Allocation, Demand, and Revenue Models are built using multiple regression and statistically tested for validation. Case study data confirms that price behaves within demand model in a non-linear manner. IS Models can represent the actual demand and revenue data better than Non-IS Models. Furthermore, IS enables hotels to earn significantly higher revenue. Thus, duopoly hotel players in general, might have reasonable incentives to share information horizontally. During off-peak season, MPS Models are able to predict the optimal equal price for both hotels. However, Nash equilibrium may not always exist depending on actual payoff of adhering or betraying mutual agreement. To optimize performance, horizontal cooperative game may be chosen over non-cooperative game. Mathematical models can be used to detect collusion among business players. Empirical testing can be used as policy input for market regulator in preventing unethical business practices potentially harming society welfare.

Keywords: horizontal cooperative game theory, hotel revenue management, information sharing, mutual price setting

Procedia PDF Downloads 257